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Java4Shell CVE-2026-114938: Find Every JVM, Patch, Hunt

Writer: Inception Security
Inception Security
7 minutes ago
15 min read
Bright sunlit comic titled Java4Shell CVE-2026-114938. A technician in a light blue shirt stands on a white concrete inspection lane with a clipboard and a yellow INSPECTION sticker roll. Three glass-front cabinets sit in a row: one labeled 17.0.21.1 with a green PATCHED tag, one with a yellow CHECK java -version tag, and one with a red UNKNOWN tag and a STATUS clipboard. Two people watch from outside a chain-link fence. Captions read Find every JVM. Then patch, then hunt. and Scanning is not compromise. Inception Security is in the corner.

What this means for your clients: A serious flaw in Java, software hidden inside many business systems and vendor appliances, is drawing attacker scans, so ask your IT provider to find every copy you run and confirm each one is updated or protected.


On November 17, Oracle and the OpenJDK project shipped fixes for Java4Shell CVE-2026-114938, a memory corruption bug in the HotSpot JVM's x86-64 Base64 decoder, disclosed by Calif. Oracle and OpenJDK score it CVSS 8.1 High, with high attack complexity. Red Hat scores it 9.8 and Calif 9.2, but 8.1 is the official number.


GreyNoise's dashboard, last updated 7:18 PM MST tonight, counts 261 Java4Shell-shaped requests from 7 IPs since November 17 and 0 successful intrusions. Cisco PSIRT knows proof-of-concept code is available but is not aware of any malicious use; AWS, Elastic and Cloudflare report no indication of exploitation on their side. VulnCheck built a full exploit for its customers but does not expect easy mass exploitation. Java4Shell CVE-2026-114938 was not in the CISA KEV catalog, version 2026.11.20, when we checked at 7:51 PM MST on November 20; CISA's November 17 alert urges immediate patching.


What Java4Shell CVE-2026-114938 needs to work


Oracle calls it difficult to exploit, but open to an unauthenticated attacker with network access through APIs such as a web service. Red Hat says four things must line up: an unpatched JDK in the affected lines, an x86-64 CPU exposing AVX-512 VBMI, the accelerated Base64 path still on, and attacker-controlled Base64 reaching the standard decoder, which often happens before login in headers, tokens and SAML.


The affected lines are 17 from 17.0.6, 21, 25 and 27, plus Oracle GraalVM and Oracle's Java 8 performance builds. OpenJDK 8 and 11 are not affected, but Azul Platform Prime is affected from Java 8 onward. Calif demonstrated pre-auth code execution in default Keycloak, Jira, Confluence, JFrog Artifactory, Jenkins and PingFederate, and post-auth in Elasticsearch and others; VulnCheck says crashing an app is far easier than code execution.


Why MSPs should care


MSPs do not manage one Java. Clients run Oracle Java, OpenJDK builds from Red Hat, Amazon, Microsoft, Azul and others, and JVMs bundled inside appliances, containers and vendor products. CISA warns those bundled runtimes may not appear as separate inventory entries. In our judgment, that blind spot is the real risk, not the score, because several vendors that ship their own JVM have no product patch tonight.


Cisco's November 20 advisory, version 1.3, still lists many affected products with fixes TBD and no workarounds. Atlassian Data Center relies on a JVM flag workaround while patches wait, Siemens has no fix yet for Industrial Edge Management or Siveillance Control, and Elastic's self-managed fixes are still upcoming.


Patch or apply the vendor workaround


Oracle and OpenJDK fixed builds are 17.0.21.1, 21.0.13.1, 25.0.5.1 and 27.0.1.1, plus Oracle Java SE 8u513-perf for the affected 8 performance builds. Amazon Corretto ships 17.0.21.1.2, 21.0.13.1.2, 25.0.5.1.2 and 27.0.1.1.4, the Microsoft Build of OpenJDK ships 17.0.21.1, 21.0.13.1 and 25.0.5.1, and Azul lists fixed Zulu and Platform Prime builds in its table. Keycloak's 26.8, 26.8.2, 26.8.2-3 and latest images carry a fixed runtime, and Jenkins says update Java and restart.


If you cannot patch tonight, Red Hat's preferred interim flag is -XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsics. An alternative is -XX:UseAVX=2, which Red Hat warns not to apply on ARM64, and Atlassian Data Center documents -XX:UseAVX=2 -XX:+IgnoreUnrecognizedVMOptions. Every flag and patch needs a restart, and for vendor products follow the vendor's path. On Linux, vendors document checking /proc/cpuinfo for avx512vbmi.


How to hunt


We have not run these in a live SIEM; tune field names and test before trusting a clean result. Hunts start at 2026-11-17T00:00:00Z, the UTC day fixes shipped. Splunk assumes Sysmon and CIM web or firewall data, Elastic assumes Elastic Defend plus a web index, CrowdStrike assumes Falcon telemetry and a LogScale web repository, and KQL assumes Defender tables plus Sentinel's CommonSecurityLog and W3CIISLog. Every YOUR_ name is a placeholder.


Test 1: every JVM and its version


Splunk, Elastic and KQL merge Java processes from the last 30 days, our window, with a package, CMDB or container SBOM inventory, then parse versions against the fixed builds. Merge Falcon process-event results with a separate inventory. Any version the query cannot parse, and any line outside 17, 21, 25 and 27, is flagged for review, not shown clean. A CPU column from a host avx512vbmi check reads unknown until you fill it.


Field mapping: Splunk uses a lookup plus Sysmon EID 1, Elastic adds already_running events and LOOKUP JOIN, Falcon adds SyntheticProcessRollup2 and CPU flags, and KQL adds the Defender software inventory and a watchlist. Falcon sees only running JVMs. Path versions can mislead; confirm clean rows with java -version.


False positives: a version or CPU hit is exposure, not compromise, and a patched JVM that has not restarted still runs the old code.


Splunk


index=YOUR_SYSMON_INDEX EventCode=1 earliest=-30d latest=now
| eval exe=lower(replace(Image, "^.*[\\\\/]", ""))
| where in(exe, "java", "java.exe", "javaw.exe")
| eval seen="process", path=Image, ver_src=Image
| append [| inputlookup YOUR_JAVA_INVENTORY.csv | eval seen="inventory", path=java_path, ver_src=java_version]
| stats values(seen) AS seen_in max(eval(if(seen="inventory", ver_src, null()))) AS inv_ver max(eval(if(seen="process", ver_src, null()))) AS proc_ver BY host path
| eval ver_src=coalesce(inv_ver, proc_ver)
| rex field=ver_src "(^|[^0-9.])(?<maj>8|11|17|21|25|27)[.](?<mi>0)[.](?<pa>[0-9]+)([.](?<b4>[0-9]+))?"
| eval pa=tonumber(pa), b4=tonumber(coalesce(b4, "0"))
| eval prerelease=if(match(ver_src, "(^|[^0-9.])(8|11|17|21|25|27)[.]0[.][0-9]+([.][0-9]+)?-[A-Za-z]"), 1, 0)
| eval status=case(isnull(maj), "1 version unknown: check the live JVM", maj="17" AND (pa<21 OR (pa=21 AND b4<1)), "2 below 17.0.21.1", maj="21" AND (pa<13 OR (pa=13 AND b4<1)), "2 below 21.0.13.1", maj="25" AND (pa<5 OR (pa=5 AND b4<1)), "2 below 25.0.5.1", maj="27" AND (pa<1 OR (pa=1 AND b4<1)), "2 below 27.0.1.1", in(maj, "17", "21", "25", "27") AND b4>1, "1 version unknown: check the live JVM", match(ver_src, "(^|[^0-9.])(17|21|25|27)[.]0[.][0-9]+[.][0-9]+[.][0-9]+"), "1 version unknown: check the live JVM", prerelease=1, "1 version unknown: check the live JVM", maj="8" OR maj="11", "3 Java 8 or 11: check for Oracle perf builds or Azul Platform Prime", true(), "4 at or above the fixed build")
| lookup YOUR_CPU_FLAGS.csv host OUTPUT avx512vbmi
| fillnull value="unknown" avx512vbmi
| sort 0 status

Elastic


FROM logs-endpoint.events.process-*, YOUR_JAVA_INVENTORY_INDEX
| WHERE (process.name IN ("java", "java.exe", "javaw.exe") AND event.action IN ("start", "exec", "already_running") AND @timestamp >= NOW() - 30 days) OR java_path IS NOT NULL
| EVAL path = COALESCE(java_path, process.executable)
| STATS inv_ver = MAX(java_version), proc_ver = MAX(process.executable), events = COUNT(*) BY host.name, path
| EVAL ver_src = COALESCE(inv_ver, proc_ver)
| GROK ver_src """(?:^|[^0-9.])(?<maj>8|11|17|21|25|27)\.(?<mi>0)\.(?<pa>[0-9]+)(?:\.(?<b4>[0-9]+))?"""
| EVAL pa = TO_INTEGER(pa), b4 = COALESCE(TO_INTEGER(b4), 0)
| EVAL prerelease = CASE(ver_src RLIKE "(.*[^0-9.])?(8|11|17|21|25|27)[.]0[.][0-9]+([.][0-9]+)?-[A-Za-z].*", 1, 0)
| EVAL status = CASE(maj IS NULL, "1 version unknown: check the live JVM", maj == "17" AND (pa < 21 OR (pa == 21 AND b4 < 1)), "2 below 17.0.21.1", maj == "21" AND (pa < 13 OR (pa == 13 AND b4 < 1)), "2 below 21.0.13.1", maj == "25" AND (pa < 5 OR (pa == 5 AND b4 < 1)), "2 below 25.0.5.1", maj == "27" AND (pa < 1 OR (pa == 1 AND b4 < 1)), "2 below 27.0.1.1", maj IN ("17", "21", "25", "27") AND b4 > 1, "1 version unknown: check the live JVM", ver_src RLIKE "(.*[^0-9.])?(17|21|25|27)[.]0[.][0-9]+[.][0-9]+[.][0-9]+.*", "1 version unknown: check the live JVM", prerelease == 1, "1 version unknown: check the live JVM", maj IN ("8", "11"), "3 Java 8 or 11: check for Oracle perf builds or Azul Platform Prime", "4 at or above the fixed build")
| LOOKUP JOIN YOUR_CPU_FLAGS_LOOKUP ON host.name
| EVAL avx512vbmi = COALESCE(avx512vbmi, "unknown")
| SORT status
| LIMIT 10000

CrowdStrike


// set the time picker to the last 30 days; upload YOUR_CPU_FLAGS.csv (aid, avx512vbmi) as a lookup file first
#event_simpleName=/^(ProcessRollup2|SyntheticProcessRollup2)$/ FileName=/^(java|java\.exe|javaw\.exe)$/i
| groupBy([aid, ImageFileName], function=[count(as=starts), max(@timestamp, as=last_seen)])
| regex("(^|[^0-9.])(?<maj>8|11|17|21|25|27)\.(?<mi>0)\.(?<pa>[0-9]+)(\.(?<b4>[0-9]+))?", field=ImageFileName, strict=false)
| default(field=maj, value="none")
| default(field=b4, value=0)
| case {
    maj="none" | status := "1 version unknown: check the live JVM" ;
    maj="17" | test(pa < 21) | status := "2 below 17.0.21.1" ;
    maj="17" pa="21" | test(b4 < 1) | status := "2 below 17.0.21.1" ;
    maj="21" | test(pa < 13) | status := "2 below 21.0.13.1" ;
    maj="21" pa="13" | test(b4 < 1) | status := "2 below 21.0.13.1" ;
    maj="25" | test(pa < 5) | status := "2 below 25.0.5.1" ;
    maj="25" pa="5" | test(b4 < 1) | status := "2 below 25.0.5.1" ;
    maj="27" | test(pa < 1) | status := "2 below 27.0.1.1" ;
    maj="27" pa="1" | test(b4 < 1) | status := "2 below 27.0.1.1" ;
    maj=/^(17|21|25|27)$/ | test(b4 > 1) | status := "1 version unknown: check the live JVM" ;
    ImageFileName=/(^|[^0-9.])(17|21|25|27)\.0\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+/ | status := "1 version unknown: check the live JVM" ;
    ImageFileName=/(^|[^0-9.])(8|11|17|21|25|27)\.0\.[0-9]+(\.[0-9]+)?-[A-Za-z]/ | status := "1 version unknown: check the live JVM" ;
    maj=/^(8|11)$/ | status := "3 Java 8 or 11: check for Oracle perf builds or Azul Platform Prime" ;
    * | status := "4 at or above the fixed build" }
| match(file="YOUR_CPU_FLAGS.csv", field=aid, column=aid, strict=false)
| default(field=avx512vbmi, value="unknown")
| sort(status, order=asc, limit=10000)

Microsoft KQL


let rx = @"(^|[^0-9.])(8|11|17|21|25|27)\.(0)\.([0-9]+)(\.([0-9]+))?";
let cpu = _GetWatchlist("YOUR_CPU_FLAGS") | project DeviceName = tostring(DeviceName), Avx512Vbmi = tostring(avx512vbmi);
union
    (DeviceProcessEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(30d) and FileName in~ ("java", "java.exe", "javaw.exe")
    | summarize LastSeen = max(Timestamp) by DeviceName, Path = FolderPath
    | extend Seen = "process", VerSrc = Path),
    (DeviceTvmSoftwareInventory
    | where SoftwareName matches regex @"(?i)jdk|jre|java|corretto|zulu|graalvm"
    | extend Path = strcat(SoftwareVendor, " ", SoftwareName), Seen = "software inventory", VerSrc = SoftwareVersion, LastSeen = now())
| extend Maj = extract(rx, 2, VerSrc), Pa = toint(extract(rx, 4, VerSrc)), B4 = coalesce(toint(extract(rx, 6, VerSrc)), 0), Prerelease = iff(VerSrc matches regex @"(^|[^0-9.])(8|11|17|21|25|27)\.0\.[0-9]+(\.[0-9]+)?-[A-Za-z]", 1, 0)
| extend Status = case(isempty(Maj), "1 version unknown: check the live JVM", Maj == "17" and (Pa < 21 or (Pa == 21 and B4 < 1)), "2 below 17.0.21.1", Maj == "21" and (Pa < 13 or (Pa == 13 and B4 < 1)), "2 below 21.0.13.1", Maj == "25" and (Pa < 5 or (Pa == 5 and B4 < 1)), "2 below 25.0.5.1", Maj == "27" and (Pa < 1 or (Pa == 1 and B4 < 1)), "2 below 27.0.1.1", Maj in ("17", "21", "25", "27") and B4 > 1, "1 version unknown: check the live JVM", VerSrc matches regex @"(^|[^0-9.])(17|21|25|27)\.0\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+", "1 version unknown: check the live JVM", Prerelease == 1, "1 version unknown: check the live JVM", Maj in ("8", "11"), "3 Java 8 or 11: check for Oracle perf builds or Azul Platform Prime", "4 at or above the fixed build")
| join kind=leftouter cpu on DeviceName
| extend Avx512Vbmi = iff(isempty(Avx512Vbmi), "unknown", Avx512Vbmi)
| project DeviceName, Path, Seen, VerSrc, Status, Avx512Vbmi, LastSeen
| order by Status asc

Hunt 1: JVM crashes and restart churn


This hunt counts hs_err_pid crash logs and Java process starts per host per day, flagging any crash file or five or more starts, our threshold. CISA asks defenders to watch for unexpected JVM crashes and suspicious Java processes; check core dumps by hand.


Field mapping: Splunk needs Sysmon EID 1 and 11, Elastic reads Defend process and file events, Falcon reads ProcessRollup2 and file writes, and KQL reads Defender process and file tables.


False positives: memory exhaustion, upgrades and tonight's patch restarts; a crash is a lead, not proof of code execution.


Splunk


index=YOUR_SYSMON_INDEX (EventCode=1 OR EventCode=11) earliest=1794873600 latest=now
| eval exe=lower(replace(coalesce(Image, ""), "^.*[\\\\/]", "")), file=lower(replace(coalesce(TargetFilename, ""), "^.*[\\\\/]", ""))
| eval kind=case(EventCode=11 AND match(file, "^hs_err_pid[0-9]+[.]log$"), "crash", EventCode=1 AND in(exe, "java", "java.exe", "javaw.exe"), "start", true(), null())
| where isnotnull(kind)
| bin _time span=1d
| stats count(eval(kind="crash")) AS crash_files count(eval(kind="start")) AS java_starts values(TargetFilename) AS files BY _time host
| where crash_files>0 OR java_starts>=5
| sort 0 - crash_files

Elastic


FROM logs-endpoint.events.*
| WHERE @timestamp >= TO_DATETIME("2026-11-17T00:00:00Z")
| EVAL crash = CASE(file.name RLIKE "hs_err_pid[0-9]+[.]log", 1, 0), start = CASE(process.name IN ("java", "java.exe", "javaw.exe") AND event.action IN ("start", "exec"), 1, 0)
| WHERE crash == 1 OR start == 1
| EVAL day = DATE_TRUNC(1 day, @timestamp)
| STATS crash_files = SUM(crash), java_starts = SUM(start), files = VALUES(file.path) BY day, host.name
| WHERE crash_files > 0 OR java_starts >= 5
| SORT crash_files DESC
| LIMIT 10000

CrowdStrike


// set the time picker to start at 2026-11-17 00:00 UTC
#event_simpleName=/^ProcessRollup2$|Written$/
| case {
    TargetFileName=/hs_err_pid[0-9]+\.log$/i | crash := 1 | start := 0 ;
    #event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2 FileName=/^(java|java\.exe|javaw\.exe)$/i | crash := 0 | start := 1 }
| day := formatTime("%Y-%m-%d", field=@timestamp, timezone="UTC")
| groupBy([aid, day], function=[sum(crash, as=crash_files), sum(start, as=java_starts), collect([TargetFileName])])
| case { test(crash_files > 0) ; test(java_starts >= 5) }
| sort(crash_files, order=desc, limit=10000)

Microsoft KQL


union
    (DeviceFileEvents
    | where Timestamp >= datetime(2026-11-17T00:00:00Z)
    | where FileName matches regex @"^hs_err_pid[0-9]+\.log$"
    | extend Crash = 1, Start = 0, Item = FolderPath),
    (DeviceProcessEvents
    | where Timestamp >= datetime(2026-11-17T00:00:00Z)
    | where FileName in~ ("java", "java.exe", "javaw.exe")
    | extend Crash = 0, Start = 1, Item = "")
| summarize CrashFiles = sum(Crash), JavaStarts = sum(Start), Files = make_set_if(Item, isnotempty(Item), 10) by Day = bin(Timestamp, 1d), DeviceName
| where CrashFiles > 0 or JavaStarts >= 5
| order by CrashFiles desc

Hunt 2: scan traffic from GreyNoise's list


This hunt flags web requests with the java4shell-attack/1.0 and java4shell-scanner/1.0 user agents GreyNoise published, then any source hitting three or more of the scan paths GreyNoise tied to shaped requests, our threshold. A java4shell-recon user agent reported by SecurityWeek, quoting watchTowr, is secondhand, so we left it out.


Field mapping: Splunk reads CIM web fields, Elastic reads ECS url and user_agent fields, LogScale assumes user_agent, url_path, client_ip and status fields, and KQL unions CommonSecurityLog with W3CIISLog.


False positives: generic scanners hit login paths all day; the named user agents are the stronger signal.


Splunk


index=YOUR_WEB_INDEX earliest=1794873600 latest=now
| eval path=lower(replace(coalesce(uri_path, uri, ""), "[?].*$", "")), ua=coalesce(http_user_agent, "")
| eval ua_hit=if(match(ua, "(?i)^java4shell-(attack|scanner)/1[.]0$"), 1, 0), hit_path=if(match(path, "^(/rest/api/space|/login[.]action|/actuator/env|/rest/api-application/1[.]0/application-info|/rpc/xml|/api/login|/api/v1/login|/auth/login|/api/json|/crumbissuer/api/json|/whoami/api/json|/cli)$"), path, null())
| where ua_hit=1 OR isnotnull(hit_path)
| stats max(ua_hit) AS ua_hit dc(hit_path) AS listed_paths values(hit_path) AS paths values(status) AS http_status count AS requests BY src
| eval flag=case(ua_hit=1, "1 Java4Shell user agent", listed_paths>=3, "2 three or more listed paths", true(), null())
| where isnotnull(flag)
| sort 0 flag - requests

Elastic


FROM YOUR_WEB_INDEX
| WHERE @timestamp >= TO_DATETIME("2026-11-17T00:00:00Z")
| EVAL path = TO_LOWER(COALESCE(url.path, "")), ua = TO_LOWER(COALESCE(user_agent.original, ""))
| EVAL ua_hit = CASE(ua RLIKE "java4shell-(attack|scanner)/1[.]0", 1, 0), hit_path = CASE(path IN ("/rest/api/space", "/login.action", "/actuator/env", "/rest/api-application/1.0/application-info", "/rpc/xml", "/api/login", "/api/v1/login", "/auth/login", "/api/json", "/crumbissuer/api/json", "/whoami/api/json", "/cli"), path, NULL)
| WHERE ua_hit == 1 OR hit_path IS NOT NULL
| STATS ua_hit = MAX(ua_hit), listed_paths = COUNT_DISTINCT(hit_path), paths = VALUES(hit_path), http_status = VALUES(http.response.status_code), requests = COUNT(*) BY source.ip
| EVAL flag = CASE(ua_hit == 1, "1 Java4Shell user agent", listed_paths >= 3, "2 three or more listed paths", NULL)
| WHERE flag IS NOT NULL
| SORT flag, requests DESC
| LIMIT 10000

CrowdStrike


// run in the repository or view that holds web, WAF or proxy logs; set the time picker to start at 2026-11-17 00:00 UTC
case { user_agent=/^java4shell-(attack|scanner)\/1\.0$/i | ua_hit := 1 ; * | ua_hit := 0 }
| url_path := lower(url_path)
| case { in(field=url_path, values=["/rest/api/space", "/login.action", "/actuator/env", "/rest/api-application/1.0/application-info", "/rpc/xml", "/api/login", "/api/v1/login", "/auth/login", "/api/json", "/crumbissuer/api/json", "/whoami/api/json", "/cli"]) | hit_path := url_path | empty_path := 0 ; * | hit_path := "" | empty_path := 1 }
| case { test(ua_hit == 1) ; hit_path=/./ }
| groupBy([client_ip], function=[max(ua_hit, as=ua_hit), count(hit_path, distinct=true, as=path_values), max(empty_path, as=empty_path), collect([hit_path, status]), count(as=requests)])
| listed_paths := path_values - empty_path
| case { test(ua_hit == 1) | flag := "1 Java4Shell user agent" ; test(listed_paths >= 3) | flag := "2 three or more listed paths" }
| sort(flag, order=asc, limit=10000)

Microsoft KQL


let paths = dynamic(["/rest/api/space", "/login.action", "/actuator/env", "/rest/api-application/1.0/application-info", "/rpc/xml", "/api/login", "/api/v1/login", "/auth/login", "/api/json", "/crumbissuer/api/json", "/whoami/api/json", "/cli"]);
union
    (CommonSecurityLog
    | where TimeGenerated >= datetime(2026-11-17T00:00:00Z)
    | extend Src = SourceIP, Ua = RequestClientApplication, Path = tolower(extract(@"^(?:[a-zA-Z]+://[^/]+)?([^?]*)", 1, RequestURL)), Status = tostring(EventOutcome)),
    (W3CIISLog
    | where TimeGenerated >= datetime(2026-11-17T00:00:00Z)
    | extend Src = cIP, Ua = csUserAgent, Path = tolower(csUriStem), Status = tostring(scStatus))
| extend UaHit = iff(Ua matches regex @"(?i)^java4shell-(attack|scanner)/1\.0$", 1, 0), HitPath = iff(Path in (paths), Path, "")
| where UaHit == 1 or isnotempty(HitPath)
| summarize UaHit = max(UaHit), Paths = make_set_if(HitPath, isnotempty(HitPath), 20), HttpStatus = make_set(Status, 10), Requests = count() by Src
| extend ListedPaths = array_length(Paths)
| extend Flag = case(UaHit == 1, "1 Java4Shell user agent", ListedPaths >= 3, "2 three or more listed paths", "")
| where isnotempty(Flag)
| order by Flag asc, Requests desc

Hunt 3: the seven shaped-request IPs


This hunt looks for any traffic with the seven IPs GreyNoise listed tonight as sending Java4Shell-shaped Base64. In our judgment, the list goes stale within days.


Field mapping: Splunk matches raw text across firewall, web and proxy indexes, Elastic reads ECS source and destination fields, Falcon reads inbound and outbound connection events, and KQL unions Defender network events with CommonSecurityLog.


False positives: NAT, shared hosting and scanners that also probe unrelated services; investigate a hit before attributing it to scanning or compromise.


Splunk


earliest=1794873600 latest=now (index=YOUR_FIREWALL_INDEX OR index=YOUR_WEB_INDEX OR index=YOUR_PROXY_INDEX) ("45.13.212.209" OR "85.0.19.34" OR "31.76.87.52" OR "217.138.216.145" OR "134.82.73.91" OR "13.212.144.112" OR "185.184.192.254")
| rex "(?<ioc>45[.]13[.]212[.]209|85[.]0[.]19[.]34|31[.]76[.]87[.]52|217[.]138[.]216[.]145|134[.]82[.]73[.]91|13[.]212[.]144[.]112|185[.]184[.]192[.]254)"
| where isnotnull(ioc)
| stats count AS events min(_time) AS first_seen max(_time) AS last_seen values(index) AS sources values(dest) AS targets values(status) AS http_status BY ioc
| sort 0 - events
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)

Elastic


FROM logs-* METADATA _index
| WHERE @timestamp >= TO_DATETIME("2026-11-17T00:00:00Z")
| EVAL src = TO_STRING(source.ip), dst = TO_STRING(destination.ip)
| WHERE src IN ("45.13.212.209", "85.0.19.34", "31.76.87.52", "217.138.216.145", "134.82.73.91", "13.212.144.112", "185.184.192.254") OR dst IN ("45.13.212.209", "85.0.19.34", "31.76.87.52", "217.138.216.145", "134.82.73.91", "13.212.144.112", "185.184.192.254")
| EVAL ioc = CASE(src IN ("45.13.212.209", "85.0.19.34", "31.76.87.52", "217.138.216.145", "134.82.73.91", "13.212.144.112", "185.184.192.254"), src, dst)
| STATS events = COUNT(*), first_seen = MIN(@timestamp), last_seen = MAX(@timestamp), sources = VALUES(_index), targets = VALUES(dst) BY ioc
| SORT events DESC
| LIMIT 10000

CrowdStrike


// set the time picker to start at 2026-11-17 00:00 UTC
#event_simpleName=/^(NetworkReceiveAcceptIP4|NetworkConnectIP4)$/
| in(field=RemoteAddressIP4, values=["45.13.212.209", "85.0.19.34", "31.76.87.52", "217.138.216.145", "134.82.73.91", "13.212.144.112", "185.184.192.254"])
| groupBy([RemoteAddressIP4, aid], function=[count(as=events), min(@timestamp, as=first_seen), max(@timestamp, as=last_seen), collect([LPort, RPort, #event_simpleName])])
| sort(events, order=desc, limit=10000)

Microsoft KQL


let gn = dynamic(["45.13.212.209", "85.0.19.34", "31.76.87.52", "217.138.216.145", "134.82.73.91", "13.212.144.112", "185.184.192.254"]);
union
    (DeviceNetworkEvents
    | where Timestamp >= datetime(2026-11-17T00:00:00Z)
    | where RemoteIP in (gn)
    | project Timestamp, Ioc = RemoteIP, Seen = strcat("Defender ", ActionType), Target = DeviceName, Port = LocalPort),
    (CommonSecurityLog
    | where TimeGenerated >= datetime(2026-11-17T00:00:00Z)
    | where SourceIP in (gn) or DestinationIP in (gn)
    | project Timestamp = TimeGenerated, Ioc = iff(SourceIP in (gn), SourceIP, DestinationIP), Seen = strcat(DeviceVendor, " ", DeviceAction), Target = DestinationIP, Port = DestinationPort)
| summarize Events = count(), FirstSeen = min(Timestamp), LastSeen = max(Timestamp), Seen = make_set(Seen, 10), Targets = make_set(Target, 20) by Ioc
| order by Events desc

Hunt 4: confirm the fix or flag is live


This hunt lists observed Java starts and their command lines. Check each running JVM's start time and effective flags; historical events alone cannot confirm that a fix or flag is live. Elastic documents checking GET _nodes/jvm, and Keycloak says to check the live JVM flags.


Field mapping: Elastic and Falcon include already-running processes; Splunk and KQL see only starts, so pair them with Test 1.


False positives: flags set through JAVA_TOOL_OPTIONS or config files may not show on the command line.


Splunk


index=YOUR_SYSMON_INDEX EventCode=1 earliest=-30d latest=now
| eval exe=lower(replace(Image, "^.*[\\\\/]", ""))
| where in(exe, "java", "java.exe", "javaw.exe")
| eval has_flag=if(match(CommandLine, "(^|\s)(-XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsics|-XX:UseAVX=[012])(\s|$)"), 1, 0)
| eval flag=case(isnull(_time), "1 start time unknown: check the live JVM", _time<1794873600, "2 start before November 17", has_flag=0, "3 no flag on the command line: confirm a fixed build", true(), "4 flag present on this start")
| table _time host Image CommandLine flag
| sort 0 flag
| convert ctime(_time)

Elastic


FROM logs-endpoint.events.process-*
| WHERE @timestamp >= NOW() - 30 days AND process.name IN ("java", "java.exe", "javaw.exe") AND event.action IN ("start", "exec", "already_running")
| EVAL started = process.start, cl = COALESCE(process.command_line, "")
| EVAL has_flag = CASE(cl RLIKE "(.*[ 	])?(-XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsics|-XX:UseAVX=[012])([ 	].*)?", 1, 0)
| EVAL flag = CASE(started IS NULL, "1 start time unknown: check the live JVM", started < TO_DATETIME("2026-11-17T00:00:00Z"), "2 start before November 17", has_flag == 0, "3 no flag on the command line: confirm a fixed build", "4 flag present on this start")
| KEEP @timestamp, host.name, process.executable, event.action, started, cl, flag
| SORT flag
| LIMIT 10000

CrowdStrike


// set the time picker to the last 30 days
#event_simpleName=/^(ProcessRollup2|SyntheticProcessRollup2)$/ FileName=/^(java|java\.exe|javaw\.exe)$/i
| default(field=ProcessStartTime, value=0)
| case { CommandLine=/(^|\s)(-XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsics|-XX:UseAVX=[012])(\s|$)/ | has_flag := 1 ; * | has_flag := 0 }
| case {
    test(ProcessStartTime == 0) | flag := "1 start time unknown: check the live JVM" ;
    test(ProcessStartTime * 1000 < 1794873600000) | flag := "2 start before November 17" ;
    test(has_flag == 0) | flag := "3 no flag on the command line: confirm a fixed build" ;
    * | flag := "4 flag present on this start" }
| sort(flag, order=asc, limit=10000)

Microsoft KQL


DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d) and FileName in~ ("java", "java.exe", "javaw.exe")
| extend HasFlag = iff(ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(^|\s)(-XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsics|-XX:UseAVX=[012])(\s|$)", 1, 0)
| extend Flag = case(isnull(ProcessCreationTime), "1 start time unknown: check the live JVM", ProcessCreationTime < datetime(2026-11-17T00:00:00Z), "2 start before November 17", HasFlag == 0, "3 no flag on the command line: confirm a fixed build", "4 flag present on this start")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, ProcessCreationTime, Flag
| order by Flag asc

Hunt 5: Authorization header shape, in prose


GreyNoise flags HTTP Basic or Bearer values of 64 or 128 characters plus 1 to 3 more, ending in "=". In our judgment this stays prose: most web, WAF and proxy logs never record Authorization values, and logging them stores credentials. Cloudflare put its new WAF rules in Log mode because legitimate tokens can match.


Indicators from GreyNoise


Type

Indicator

GreyNoise description

User-Agent

java4shell-attack/1.0

Observed from shaped-request IP 85.0.19[.]34 (GreyNoise)

User-Agent

java4shell-scanner/1.0

Observed from 104.168[.]35[.]123, 212.135[.]42[.]4, 213.230[.]125[.]2 and 223.185[.]134[.]103 (GreyNoise)

IPv4

45.13.212[.]209

Sent Java4Shell-shaped Base64, 128 sessions as of 7:18 PM MST Nov 20

IPv4

85.0.19[.]34

Sent Java4Shell-shaped Base64, 70 sessions as of 7:18 PM MST Nov 20

IPv4

31.76.87[.]52

Sent Java4Shell-shaped Base64, 25 sessions as of 7:18 PM MST Nov 20

IPv4

217.138.216[.]145

Sent Java4Shell-shaped Base64, 22 sessions as of 7:18 PM MST Nov 20

IPv4

134.82.73[.]91

Sent Java4Shell-shaped Base64, 6 sessions as of 7:18 PM MST Nov 20

IPv4

13.212.144[.]112

Sent Java4Shell-shaped Base64, 5 sessions as of 7:18 PM MST Nov 20

IPv4

185.184.192[.]254

Sent Java4Shell-shaped Base64, 5 sessions as of 7:18 PM MST Nov 20

Scan path

/rest/api/space

Requested by a shaped-request IP; scan path, not malware

Scan path

/login.action

Requested by a shaped-request IP; scan path, not malware

Scan path

/actuator/env

Requested by a shaped-request IP; scan path, not malware

Scan path

/rest/api-application/1.0/application-info

Requested by a shaped-request IP; scan path, not malware

Scan path

/rpc/xml

Requested by a shaped-request IP; scan path, not malware

Scan path

/api/login

Requested by a shaped-request IP; scan path, not malware

Scan path

/api/v1/login

Requested by a shaped-request IP; scan path, not malware

Scan path

/auth/login

Requested by a shaped-request IP; scan path, not malware

Scan path

/api/json

Requested by a shaped-request IP; scan path, not malware

Scan path

/crumbIssuer/api/json

Requested by a shaped-request IP; scan path, not malware

Scan path

/whoAmI/api/json

Requested by a shaped-request IP; scan path, not malware

Scan path

/cli

Requested by a shaped-request IP; scan path, not malware


Reading the results before you escalate


In our judgment, a Test 1 row below the fix on an AVX-512 VBMI or unknown CPU, facing the internet, is tonight's priority. A crash on that host, or a Hunt 2 or Hunt 3 hit against it, means patch first, then preserve logs and look closer; none of those alone proves a compromise.


One next step


If your clients run on Microsoft 365, start with a free Inception Foresight M365 Assessment.


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