vCenter CVE-2026-123890 Zero Day Exploited by ARMORY CASTLE


What this means for your clients: Attackers hijacked companies' VMware vCenter servers, which run their virtual machines, through a flaw unpatched until November 19, so ask your IT provider whether your vCenter is updated and checked for intruders.
On November 19, Broadcom published VMSA-2026-0009 for vCenter CVE-2026-123890, an authentication bypass in the VMware Directory Service inside VMware vCenter, rated Critical at CVSSv3 9.8. The same day, GTIG and Mandiant reported that ARMORY CASTLE, a suspected PRC-nexus actor formerly tracked as UNC5221, exploited it as a zero day in early September 2026. Broadcom's advisory does not mention in-the-wild use; it credits Mandiant with the report.
In that intrusion the first foothold was BeyondTrust Remote Support CVE-2026-102764, which we covered in our October 16 hunt guide. As of 6:31 AM MST on November 20, CVE-2026-123890 was not in the CISA KEV catalog, which was still at version 2026.11.18. In our judgment, that gap should not slow anyone: this bug was used more than two months before a fix shipped.
How vCenter CVE-2026-123890 works
Broadcom says a malicious actor with network access to vCenter may exploit it to bypass authentication. GTIG describes an unauthenticated session key disclosure in vmdird's DCE/RPC interface on TCP 2012 that yields an authenticated session as administrator@vsphere.local, letting an attacker run commands and pull the SSO database. Broadcom's FAQ says it is distinct from July's CVE-2026-59309, so an older 59309 patch is not enough.
What ARMORY CASTLE did with it
In GTIG's account, the actor worked from a compromised internal Linux appliance with no EDR. BONESAW used the bug to copy the SSO database, hijack the SAML token service and create an SSO administrator. SAWSNAKE then forged SAML assertions and session cookies, a Golden SAML attack GTIG says can bypass MFA and impersonate any user. BEARBONES, a backdoored Dropbear SSH server, listened on TCP 33992.
The actor created a local vsphere.local administrator whose name GTIG redacted after sps-, enabled SSH on the VCSA through a VAMI API PUT, stole the vCenter master crypto key and PostgreSQL password, and disabled SSH again. It then reached ESXi as vpxuser and root, added an SSH key, staged data in a hidden .a directory on a VMFS volume and extracted guest files. Another appliance got LAZYBONES, a Go backdoor that uses Slack for command and control. Neither source publishes a victim count.
Why MSPs should care
Whoever holds vCenter SSO holds the vSphere VMs, datastores and often guest disks, and forged SAML tokens survive a password reset. Exploitation needs only network access, which jump boxes, RMM and backup servers often have. In our judgment, MSPs running several clients' vCenters should patch and hunt every appliance this week.
Patch to Broadcom's fixed versions
For CVE-2026-123890, Broadcom lists vCenter 9.1.1.0200 for 9.1.x, 9.0.2.0200 for 9.0.x, and 8.0 U3m for standalone 8.0 and for VCF 5.x through KB88287, plus SDDC Manager 5.2.5. Telco Cloud Platform and Telco Cloud Infrastructure use KB463116. Newer builds with those fixes count. ESXi needs no update here.
vCenter 7.0 is affected with no public fix; Broadcom points extended support customers to Support and presumes 6.5 and 6.7 are affected. GTIG says BONESAW fully compromises 7.x and 8.x appliances, so an unpatched 7.0 appliance is not safe. There is no workaround, and avoiding Enhanced Linked Mode does not help. In our judgment, limiting who can reach TCP 2012, 5480, 443 and 22 is the best compensating control, with Mandiant's VCSA Hardening and Logging Tool.
If compromised, rebuild from a known-good state rather than cleaning the SSO database by hand, and rotate the SSO material, SAML signing key, vCenter master key, PostgreSQL password and ESXi root keys.
How to hunt
We have not run these in a live SIEM; tune field names and test before trusting a clean result. Hunts start at 2026-08-01T00:00:00Z, our choice, a month before GTIG's early September window. vCenter and ESXi logs usually arrive by syslog, so each platform assumes a syslog store beside its endpoint data: Splunk with Sysmon for Linux, Elastic with Elastic Defend, CrowdStrike with Falcon LogScale, and KQL with Sentinel's Syslog and Defender tables. Every YOUR_ and REPLACE_WITH_ name is a placeholder.
Test 1: which vCenter appliances sit below the fix
This exposure check, our design, merges your vCenter inventory with hosts seen on TCP 2012 or 5480 in the last 30 days, our window, so idle inventory and unlisted network hits show in Splunk, Elastic and KQL. Queries use Broadcom builds 25901347 (9.1.1.0200), 25901331 (9.0.2.0200) and 25934264 (8.0 U3m and VCF 5.2.5); 7.0 and older stay flagged.
Field mapping: Splunk uses a lookup and firewall fields, Elastic an inventory index and flow logs, Falcon managed-host connections plus a CSV, and KQL a watchlist plus Defender network events. Falcon lists only appliances that managed hosts reached, so also review CSV rows missing from its output.
False positives: a version hit is exposure, not compromise, and inventory versions can lag behind patches.
Splunk
| inputlookup YOUR_VCENTER_INVENTORY.csv
| eval ip=vc_ip, seen="inventory"
| append [search index=YOUR_FIREWALL_INDEX earliest=-30d latest=now (dest_port=2012 OR dest_port=5480)
| stats count BY dest_ip
| eval ip=dest_ip, seen="network: TCP 2012 or 5480"]
| stats values(seen) AS seen_in values(vc_name) AS name values(vc_version) AS version max(vc_build) AS build BY ip
| eval fix91=tonumber(25901347), fix90=tonumber(25901331), fix80=tonumber(25934264), build=tonumber(build)
| eval status=case(isnull(version), "no version on record: treat as exposed", match(version, "^[1-7][.]"), "affected or presumed affected: review support", isnull(build), "no build on record: verify patch", match(version, "^9[.]1([.]|$)") AND build<fix91, "below 9.1.1.0200", match(version, "^9[.]0([.]|$)") AND build<fix90, "below 9.0.2.0200", match(version, "^8[.]0([.]|$)") AND build<fix80, "below 8.0 U3m", match(version, "^(9[.][01]|8[.]0)([.]|$)"), "at or above the fixed build on record", true(), "unrecognized version: verify patch")
| sort statusElastic
FROM YOUR_VCENTER_INVENTORY_INDEX, logs-* METADATA _index
| WHERE vc_ip IS NOT NULL OR (destination.port IN (2012, 5480) AND @timestamp >= NOW() - 30 days)
| EVAL ip = COALESCE(TO_STRING(vc_ip), TO_STRING(destination.ip)), seen = CASE(vc_ip IS NOT NULL, "inventory", "network: TCP 2012 or 5480"), b = TO_INTEGER(vc_build)
| STATS seen_in = VALUES(seen), name = VALUES(vc_name), version = MAX(vc_version), build = MAX(b) BY ip
| EVAL fix91 = TO_INTEGER(25901347), fix90 = TO_INTEGER(25901331), fix80 = TO_INTEGER(25934264)
| EVAL status = CASE(version IS NULL, "no version on record: treat as exposed", version RLIKE "[1-7][.].*", "affected or presumed affected: review support", build IS NULL, "no build on record: verify patch", version RLIKE "9[.]1([.].*)?" AND build < fix91, "below 9.1.1.0200", version RLIKE "9[.]0([.].*)?" AND build < fix90, "below 9.0.2.0200", version RLIKE "8[.]0([.].*)?" AND build < fix80, "below 8.0 U3m", version RLIKE "(9[.][01]|8[.]0)([.].*)?", "at or above the fixed build on record", "unrecognized version: verify patch")
| SORT statusCrowdStrike
// set the time picker to the last 30 days; upload YOUR_VCENTER_INVENTORY.csv as a lookup file first
#event_simpleName=NetworkConnectIP4
| in(field=RPort, values=["2012", "5480"])
| match(file="YOUR_VCENTER_INVENTORY.csv", field=RemoteAddressIP4, column=vc_ip, strict=false)
| default(field=[vc_name, vc_version], value="none", replaceEmpty=true)
| default(field=vc_build, value=0, replaceEmpty=true)
| groupBy([RemoteAddressIP4, vc_name, vc_version, vc_build], function=[count(as=connections), count(aid, distinct=true, as=clients)])
| fix91 := 25901347
| fix90 := 25901331
| fix80 := 25934264
| case {
vc_version="none" | status := "not in inventory: treat as exposed" ;
vc_version=/^[1-7]\./ | status := "affected or presumed affected: review support" ;
vc_version=/^9\.1(\.|$)/ | test(vc_build < fix91) | status := "below 9.1.1.0200" ;
vc_version=/^9\.0(\.|$)/ | test(vc_build < fix90) | status := "below 9.0.2.0200" ;
vc_version=/^8\.0(\.|$)/ | test(vc_build < fix80) | status := "below 8.0 U3m" ;
vc_version=/^(9\.[01]|8\.0)(\.|$)/ | status := "at or above the fixed build on record" ;
* | status := "unrecognized version: verify patch" }
| sort(status, order=asc)Microsoft KQL
let fix91 = toint(25901347);
let fix90 = toint(25901331);
let fix80 = toint(25934264);
union
(_GetWatchlist("YOUR_VCENTER_INVENTORY")
| project Ip = tostring(vc_ip), Name = tostring(vc_name), Version = tostring(vc_version), Build = toint(vc_build), Seen = "inventory"),
(DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d) and RemotePort in (2012, 5480)
| distinct RemoteIP
| project Ip = RemoteIP, Seen = "network: TCP 2012 or 5480")
| summarize SeenIn = make_set(Seen), Name = take_anyif(Name, isnotempty(Name)), Version = take_anyif(Version, isnotempty(Version)), Build = max(Build) by Ip
| extend Status = case(isempty(Version), "no version on record: treat as exposed", Version matches regex @"^[1-7]\.", "affected or presumed affected: review support", isnull(Build), "no build on record: verify patch", Version matches regex @"^9\.1(\.|$)" and Build < fix91, "below 9.1.1.0200", Version matches regex @"^9\.0(\.|$)" and Build < fix90, "below 9.0.2.0200", Version matches regex @"^8\.0(\.|$)" and Build < fix80, "below 8.0 U3m", Version matches regex @"^(9\.[01]|8\.0)(\.|$)", "at or above the fixed build on record", "unrecognized version: verify patch")
| order by Status ascHunt 1: new or unexpected vsphere.local administrators
This hunt lists vsphere.local accounts in vCenter syslog, flagging the sps- prefix, then accounts first seen since September 1 against an August baseline, our choice, with nearby administrator wording as our heuristic. GTIG says BONESAW can also create a machine account and assign Global Administrator rights.
Field mapping: every platform pulls account names from raw syslog text, since SSO fields vary by collector; Falcon assumes a host field.
False positives: legitimate service and machine accounts live in vsphere.local; add them to the approved list.
Splunk
index=YOUR_VCENTER_SYSLOG_INDEX "vsphere.local" earliest=1785542400 latest=now
| rex max_match=20 "(?i)(?<acct>[a-z0-9._-]+@vsphere[.]local)"
| mvexpand acct
| eval acct=lower(acct), admin_hint=if(match(_raw, "(?i)global administrator|administrators"), 1, 0)
| stats min(_time) AS first_seen max(_time) AS last_seen count AS events max(admin_hint) AS admin_hint values(host) AS hosts BY acct
| eval flag=case(match(acct, "^sps-"), "1 published sps- prefix", first_seen>=1788220800 AND admin_hint=1, "2 new since Sep 1, near admin wording", first_seen>=1788220800, "3 new since Sep 1", true(), null())
| where isnotnull(flag) AND NOT in(acct, "YOUR_APPROVED_ACCOUNT_1", "YOUR_APPROVED_ACCOUNT_2")
| sort flag
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)Elastic
FROM YOUR_VCENTER_SYSLOG_INDEX
| WHERE @timestamp >= TO_DATETIME("2026-08-01T00:00:00Z") AND TO_LOWER(message) LIKE "*vsphere.local*"
| EVAL msg_lc = TO_LOWER(message)
| GROK msg_lc """(?<acct_a>[a-z0-9._-]+@vsphere\.local)"""
| GROK msg_lc """(?:^|.*[^a-z0-9._-])(?<acct_b>[a-z0-9._-]+@vsphere\.local)"""
| EVAL acct = CASE(acct_b IS NULL OR acct_b == acct_a, acct_a, MV_APPEND(acct_a, acct_b))
| MV_EXPAND acct
| EVAL admin_hint = CASE(msg_lc RLIKE ".*(global administrator|administrators).*", 1, 0)
| STATS first_seen = MIN(@timestamp), last_seen = MAX(@timestamp), events = COUNT(*), admin_hint = MAX(admin_hint), hosts = VALUES(host.name) BY acct
| EVAL flag = CASE(acct LIKE "sps-*", "1 published sps- prefix", first_seen >= TO_DATETIME("2026-09-01T00:00:00Z") AND admin_hint == 1, "2 new since Sep 1, near admin wording", first_seen >= TO_DATETIME("2026-09-01T00:00:00Z"), "3 new since Sep 1", NULL)
| WHERE flag IS NOT NULL AND acct NOT IN ("YOUR_APPROVED_ACCOUNT_1", "YOUR_APPROVED_ACCOUNT_2")
| SORT flagCrowdStrike
// run in the repository or view that holds vCenter syslog; set the time picker to start at 2026-08-01 00:00 UTC
@rawstring=/vsphere\.local/i
| regex("(?i)(?<acct>[a-z0-9._-]+@vsphere\.local)", field=@rawstring, repeat=true)
| acct := lower(acct)
| case { @rawstring=/global administrator|administrators/i | admin_hint := 1 ; * | admin_hint := 0 }
| groupBy([acct], function=[min(@timestamp, as=first_seen), max(@timestamp, as=last_seen), count(as=events), max(admin_hint, as=admin_hint), collect([host])])
| case {
acct=/^sps-/ | flag := "1 published sps- prefix" ;
test(first_seen >= 1788220800000) | test(admin_hint == 1) | flag := "2 new since Sep 1, near admin wording" ;
test(first_seen >= 1788220800000) | flag := "3 new since Sep 1" }
| !in(field=acct, values=["YOUR_APPROVED_ACCOUNT_1", "YOUR_APPROVED_ACCOUNT_2"])
| sort(flag, order=asc)Microsoft KQL
let approved = dynamic(["YOUR_APPROVED_ACCOUNT_1", "YOUR_APPROVED_ACCOUNT_2"]);
Syslog
| where TimeGenerated >= datetime(2026-08-01T00:00:00Z)
| where SyslogMessage contains "vsphere.local"
| extend Accounts = extract_all(@"(?i)([a-z0-9._-]+@vsphere\.local)", SyslogMessage), AdminHint = iff(SyslogMessage matches regex @"(?i)global administrator|administrators", 1, 0)
| mv-expand Acct = Accounts to typeof(string)
| extend Acct = tolower(Acct)
| summarize FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated), Events = count(), AdminHint = max(AdminHint), Hosts = make_set(Computer, 10) by Acct
| extend Flag = case(Acct startswith "sps-", "1 published sps- prefix", FirstSeen >= datetime(2026-09-01) and AdminHint == 1, "2 new since Sep 1, near admin wording", FirstSeen >= datetime(2026-09-01), "3 new since Sep 1", "")
| where isnotempty(Flag) and Acct !in (approved)
| order by Flag ascHunt 2: SSH turned on through VAMI
This hunt finds VAMI API calls to /rest/appliance/access/ssh, ranking PUT requests first, plus SSH logins to the appliance, and marks days with both. GTIG's Google SecOps rule "VMware vCenter VAMI API SSH Enablement" is existing coverage.
Field mapping: method and path come from VAMI access logs or a proxy in front of 5480; Falcon reads raw text, and KQL unions Syslog with CommonSecurityLog.
False positives: planned maintenance, which should match a change record.
Splunk
(index=YOUR_VCENTER_SYSLOG_INDEX OR index=YOUR_PROXY_INDEX) earliest=1785542400 latest=now ("/rest/appliance/access/ssh" OR "Accepted")
| eval finding=case(match(_raw, "PUT[ ]+[^ ]*/rest/appliance/access/ssh"), "1 VAMI SSH change (PUT)", match(_raw, "/rest/appliance/access/ssh"), "2 VAMI SSH API read", match(_raw, "Accepted (password|publickey|keyboard-interactive) for"), "3 SSH login", true(), null())
| where isnotnull(finding)
| bin _time span=1d
| stats values(finding) AS findings count AS events BY _time host
| eval toggle_and_login=if(isnotnull(mvfind(findings,"^1 ")) AND isnotnull(mvfind(findings,"^3 ")), "yes", "no")
| sort - toggle_and_loginElastic
FROM YOUR_VCENTER_SYSLOG_INDEX, YOUR_PROXY_INDEX
| WHERE @timestamp >= TO_DATETIME("2026-08-01T00:00:00Z")
| EVAL raw = CONCAT(COALESCE(message, ""), " ", TO_UPPER(COALESCE(http.request.method, "")), " ", COALESCE(url.original, ""))
| EVAL finding = CASE(raw RLIKE ".*PUT +[^ ]*/rest/appliance/access/ssh.*", "1 VAMI SSH change (PUT)", raw RLIKE ".*/rest/appliance/access/ssh.*", "2 VAMI SSH API read", raw RLIKE ".*Accepted (password|publickey|keyboard-interactive) for.*", "3 SSH login", NULL)
| WHERE finding IS NOT NULL
| EVAL day = DATE_TRUNC(1 day, @timestamp)
| STATS findings = VALUES(finding), events = COUNT(*) BY day, host.name
| EVAL toggle_and_login = CASE(MV_CONTAINS(findings, "1 VAMI SSH change (PUT)") AND MV_CONTAINS(findings, "3 SSH login"), "yes", "no")
| SORT toggle_and_login DESC, day DESCCrowdStrike
// run in the repository or view that holds vCenter syslog and proxy logs; set the time picker to start at 2026-08-01 00:00 UTC
@rawstring=/\/rest\/appliance\/access\/ssh|Accepted (password|publickey|keyboard-interactive) for/
| case {
@rawstring=/PUT +[^ ]*\/rest\/appliance\/access\/ssh/ | finding := "1 VAMI SSH change (PUT)" ;
@rawstring=/\/rest\/appliance\/access\/ssh/ | finding := "2 VAMI SSH API read" ;
* | finding := "3 SSH login" }
| day := formatTime("%Y-%m-%d", field=@timestamp, timezone="UTC")
| case { finding = "1 VAMI SSH change (PUT)" | put_flag := 1 ; * | put_flag := 0 }
| case { finding = "3 SSH login" | login_flag := 1 ; * | login_flag := 0 }
| groupBy([day, host], function=[collect([finding]), count(as=events), max(put_flag, as=has_put), max(login_flag, as=has_login)])
| case { test(has_put == 1) | test(has_login == 1) | toggle_and_login := "yes" ; * | toggle_and_login := "no" }
| sort(toggle_and_login, order=desc)Microsoft KQL
union isfuzzy=true
(Syslog
| where TimeGenerated >= datetime(2026-08-01T00:00:00Z)
| where SyslogMessage contains "/rest/appliance/access/ssh" or SyslogMessage matches regex @"Accepted (password|publickey|keyboard-interactive) for"
| extend Raw = SyslogMessage, Host = Computer),
(CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated >= datetime(2026-08-01T00:00:00Z)
| where RequestURL contains "/rest/appliance/access/ssh"
| extend Raw = strcat(RequestMethod, " ", RequestURL), Host = DestinationHostName)
| extend Finding = case(Raw matches regex @"PUT +[^ ]*/rest/appliance/access/ssh", "1 VAMI SSH change (PUT)", Raw contains "/rest/appliance/access/ssh", "2 VAMI SSH API read", "3 SSH login")
| summarize Findings = make_set(Finding), Events = count() by Day = bin(TimeGenerated, 1d), Host
| extend ToggleAndLogin = iff(set_has_element(Findings, "1 VAMI SSH change (PUT)") and set_has_element(Findings, "3 SSH login"), "yes", "no")
| order by ToggleAndLogin desc, Day descHunt 3: GTIG's files and commands on Linux appliances
This hunt checks Linux appliances and jump boxes for GTIG's file paths, gdb run with /tmp/gdb_file, curl fetching /content/r.js, and nmap aimed at 2012, 5480 or 9080. Check by hand for GTIG's systemd service restarting vmtoolscs every 50 minutes, and run its YARA rules.
Field mapping: Splunk needs Sysmon for Linux EID 1 and 11, Elastic needs Elastic Defend, Falcon reads ProcessRollup2 and file writes, and KQL reads Defender process and file tables.
False positives: u.jsp and /tmp/123 are short names an app could reuse, and missing EDR makes silence weak.
Splunk
index=YOUR_SYSMON_LINUX_INDEX (EventCode=1 OR EventCode=11) earliest=1785542400 latest=now
| eval path=coalesce(TargetFilename, Image), cl=coalesce(CommandLine, "")
| eval finding=case(match(path, "^/tmp/(123|123[.]key|123[.]rar|sss|dbr|gdb_file|rar|rsa_host_key|ecdsa_host_key|dss_host_key)$|^/usr/bin/vmtoolscs$|/(ActiveSer|u)[.]jsp$"), "1 GTIG file path", match(cl, "gdb.*--command[= ]?/tmp/gdb_file|curl.*(/tmp/(rar|123[.]rar)|/content/r[.]js)"), "2 GTIG command pattern", match(cl, "nmap.*(2012|5480|9080)"), "3 nmap at vCenter ports", true(), null())
| where isnotnull(finding)
| stats min(_time) AS first_seen values(path) AS paths values(CommandLine) AS commands BY host finding
| convert ctime(first_seen)Elastic
FROM logs-endpoint.events.*
| WHERE @timestamp >= TO_DATETIME("2026-08-01T00:00:00Z")
| EVAL path = COALESCE(file.path, process.executable), cl = COALESCE(process.command_line, "")
| EVAL finding = CASE(path RLIKE "/tmp/(123|123[.]key|123[.]rar|sss|dbr|gdb_file|rar|rsa_host_key|ecdsa_host_key|dss_host_key)|/usr/bin/vmtoolscs|.*/(ActiveSer|u)[.]jsp", "1 GTIG file path", cl RLIKE ".*(gdb.*--command[= ]?/tmp/gdb_file|curl.*(/tmp/(rar|123[.]rar)|/content/r[.]js)).*", "2 GTIG command pattern", cl RLIKE ".*nmap.*(2012|5480|9080).*", "3 nmap at vCenter ports", NULL)
| WHERE finding IS NOT NULL
| STATS first_seen = MIN(@timestamp), paths = VALUES(path), commands = VALUES(process.command_line) BY host.name, findingCrowdStrike
// set the time picker to start at 2026-08-01 00:00 UTC
#event_simpleName=/^ProcessRollup2$|Written$/
| case {
ImageFileName=/^\/tmp\/(123|123\.key|123\.rar|sss|dbr|gdb_file|rar|rsa_host_key|ecdsa_host_key|dss_host_key)$|^\/usr\/bin\/vmtoolscs$/ | finding := "1 GTIG file path" ;
TargetFileName=/^\/tmp\/(123|123\.key|123\.rar|sss|dbr|gdb_file|rar|rsa_host_key|ecdsa_host_key|dss_host_key)$|^\/usr\/bin\/vmtoolscs$|\/(ActiveSer|u)\.jsp$/ | finding := "1 GTIG file path" ;
CommandLine=/gdb.*--command[= ]?\/tmp\/gdb_file|curl.*(\/tmp\/(rar|123\.rar)|\/content\/r\.js)/ | finding := "2 GTIG command pattern" ;
CommandLine=/nmap.*(2012|5480|9080)/ | finding := "3 nmap at vCenter ports" }
| groupBy([aid, finding], function=[min(@timestamp, as=first_seen), collect([ImageFileName, TargetFileName, CommandLine])])Microsoft KQL
let paths = @"^/tmp/(123|123\.key|123\.rar|sss|dbr|gdb_file|rar|rsa_host_key|ecdsa_host_key|dss_host_key)$|^/usr/bin/vmtoolscs$|/(ActiveSer|u)\.jsp$";
union
(DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp >= datetime(2026-08-01T00:00:00Z)
| extend FullPath = iff(FolderPath endswith strcat("/", FileName), FolderPath, strcat(FolderPath, "/", FileName))
| extend Finding = case(FullPath matches regex paths, "1 GTIG file path", ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"gdb.*--command[= ]?/tmp/gdb_file|curl.*(/tmp/(rar|123\.rar)|/content/r\.js)", "2 GTIG command pattern", ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"nmap.*(2012|5480|9080)", "3 nmap at vCenter ports", ""), Item = strcat(FullPath, " ", ProcessCommandLine)),
(DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp >= datetime(2026-08-01T00:00:00Z)
| extend FullPath = iff(FolderPath endswith strcat("/", FileName), FolderPath, strcat(FolderPath, "/", FileName))
| extend Finding = iff(FullPath matches regex paths, "1 GTIG file path", ""), Item = FullPath)
| where isnotempty(Finding)
| summarize FirstSeen = min(Timestamp), Items = make_set(Item, 20) by DeviceName, FindingHunt 4: network traffic around vCenter
This hunt flags GTIG's 11 suspected obfuscation network IPs, the BEARBONES banner, LAZYBONES Slack API calls, TCP 33992, and TCP 2012 from outside your approved admin range. GTIG found those IPs by banner pivoting, so treat them as leads.
Field mapping: only Splunk and Elastic see the banner, via Zeek or NDR text; Falcon sees managed-host connections and DNS, and KQL adds CommonSecurityLog.
False positives: admins and backup tools reach vCenter constantly; 2012 from an unmanaged Linux box is the strong signal.
Splunk
(index=YOUR_FIREWALL_INDEX OR index=YOUR_PROXY_INDEX OR index=YOUR_ZEEK_INDEX) earliest=1785542400 latest=now
| eval peers=coalesce(src_ip, "")." ".coalesce(dest_ip, "")
| eval finding=case(match(_raw, "SSH-2[.]0-pulsesecure_23345"), "1 BEARBONES banner", match(peers, "(^| )(103[.]147[.]251[.]5|103[.]190[.]38[.]3|118[.]174[.]128[.]34|118[.]174[.]128[.]36|118[.]174[.]128[.]38|176[.]9[.]89[.]66|185[.]71[.]15[.]109|220[.]121[.]128[.]41|222[.]108[.]77[.]44|61[.]216[.]56[.]127|81[.]45[.]89[.]43)( |$)"), "2 GTIG obfuscation network IP", match(coalesce(url, ""), "slack[.]com/api/(files[.]getUploadURLExternal|files[.]completeUploadExternal|conversations[.]history)"), "3 Slack API upload or history call", dest_port=33992, "4 TCP 33992", dest_port=2012 AND NOT cidrmatch("YOUR_APPROVED_ADMIN_CIDR", src_ip), "5 SSO RPC 2012 from unapproved source", true(), null())
| where isnotnull(finding)
| fillnull value="-" src_ip dest_ip dest_port
| stats count AS events min(_time) AS first_seen BY finding src_ip dest_ip dest_port
| sort finding
| convert ctime(first_seen)Elastic
FROM logs-*
| WHERE @timestamp >= TO_DATETIME("2026-08-01T00:00:00Z")
| EVAL src = TO_STRING(source.ip), dst = TO_STRING(destination.ip), u = COALESCE(url.original, ""), m = COALESCE(message, "")
| EVAL approved = COALESCE(CIDR_MATCH(source.ip, "YOUR_APPROVED_ADMIN_CIDR"), false)
| EVAL finding = CASE(m RLIKE ".*SSH-2[.]0-pulsesecure_23345.*", "1 BEARBONES banner", src IN ("103.147.251.5", "103.190.38.3", "118.174.128.34", "118.174.128.36", "118.174.128.38", "176.9.89.66", "185.71.15.109", "220.121.128.41", "222.108.77.44", "61.216.56.127", "81.45.89.43") OR dst IN ("103.147.251.5", "103.190.38.3", "118.174.128.34", "118.174.128.36", "118.174.128.38", "176.9.89.66", "185.71.15.109", "220.121.128.41", "222.108.77.44", "61.216.56.127", "81.45.89.43"), "2 GTIG obfuscation network IP", u RLIKE ".*slack[.]com/api/(files[.]getUploadURLExternal|files[.]completeUploadExternal|conversations[.]history).*", "3 Slack API upload or history call", destination.port == 33992, "4 TCP 33992", destination.port == 2012 AND approved == false, "5 SSO RPC 2012 from unapproved source", NULL)
| WHERE finding IS NOT NULL
| STATS events = COUNT(*), first_seen = MIN(@timestamp) BY finding, src, dst, destination.port
| SORT findingCrowdStrike
// set the time picker to start at 2026-08-01 00:00 UTC
#event_simpleName=/^(NetworkConnectIP4|NetworkReceiveAcceptIP4|NetworkListenIP4|DnsRequest)$/
| case {
in(field=RemoteAddressIP4, values=["103.147.251.5", "103.190.38.3", "118.174.128.34", "118.174.128.36", "118.174.128.38", "176.9.89.66", "185.71.15.109", "220.121.128.41", "222.108.77.44", "61.216.56.127", "81.45.89.43"]) | finding := "2 GTIG obfuscation network IP" ;
#event_simpleName=DnsRequest DomainName=/(^|\.)slack\.com$/i | in(field=aid, values=["REPLACE_WITH_SERVER_AID_1", "REPLACE_WITH_SERVER_AID_2"]) | finding := "3 Slack lookup from a server" ;
#event_simpleName=/^(NetworkListenIP4|NetworkReceiveAcceptIP4)$/ LocalPort=33992 | finding := "4 TCP 33992" ;
#event_simpleName=NetworkConnectIP4 RPort=33992 | finding := "4 TCP 33992" ;
#event_simpleName=NetworkConnectIP4 RPort=2012 | !cidr(LocalAddressIP4, subnet="YOUR_APPROVED_ADMIN_CIDR") | finding := "5 SSO RPC 2012 from unapproved source" }
| groupBy([finding, aid], function=[count(as=events), min(@timestamp, as=first_seen), collect([RemoteAddressIP4, RPort, LocalPort, DomainName])])
| sort(finding, order=asc)Microsoft KQL
let gtig = dynamic(["103.147.251.5", "103.190.38.3", "118.174.128.34", "118.174.128.36", "118.174.128.38", "176.9.89.66", "185.71.15.109", "220.121.128.41", "222.108.77.44", "61.216.56.127", "81.45.89.43"]);
union isfuzzy=true
(DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp >= datetime(2026-08-01T00:00:00Z)
| extend Approved = coalesce(ipv4_is_in_range(LocalIP, "YOUR_APPROVED_ADMIN_CIDR"), false)
| extend Finding = case(RemoteIP in (gtig), "2 GTIG obfuscation network IP", RemoteUrl contains "slack.com" and InitiatingProcessFileName == "vmtoolscs" and InitiatingProcessFolderPath startswith "/usr/bin", "3 Slack from vmtoolscs", (LocalPort == 33992 and ActionType in ("ListeningConnectionCreated", "InboundConnectionAccepted")) or (RemotePort == 33992 and ActionType == "ConnectionSuccess"), "4 TCP 33992", RemotePort == 2012 and not(Approved), "5 SSO RPC 2012 from unapproved source", "")
| project Timestamp, Finding, Device = DeviceName, Src = LocalIP, Dst = RemoteIP, Port = iff(ActionType in ("ListeningConnectionCreated", "InboundConnectionAccepted") and LocalPort == 33992, LocalPort, RemotePort)),
(CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated >= datetime(2026-08-01T00:00:00Z)
| extend Approved = coalesce(ipv4_is_in_range(SourceIP, "YOUR_APPROVED_ADMIN_CIDR"), false)
| extend Finding = case(SourceIP in (gtig) or DestinationIP in (gtig), "2 GTIG obfuscation network IP", RequestURL matches regex @"slack\.com/api/(files\.getUploadURLExternal|files\.completeUploadExternal|conversations\.history)", "3 Slack API upload or history call", DestinationPort == 33992, "4 TCP 33992", DestinationPort == 2012 and not(Approved), "5 SSO RPC 2012 from unapproved source", "")
| project Timestamp = TimeGenerated, Finding, Device = coalesce(DestinationHostName, DeviceName), Src = SourceIP, Dst = DestinationIP, Port = DestinationPort)
| where isnotempty(Finding)
| summarize Events = count(), FirstSeen = min(Timestamp) by Finding, Device, Src, Dst, Port
| order by Finding ascHunt 5: ESXi follow-on
This hunt searches ESXi syslog for vmfs_browser.py, vmfs-pydist.tar.gz, o.tar.gz, a hidden .a directory under /vmfs/volumes, authorized_keys changes, and WinSCP or scp sessions. Hypervisors rarely run EDR.
Field mapping: every platform reads raw ESXi syslog text, in LogScale for Falcon and Sentinel's Syslog table for KQL.
False positives: admins use scp and edit authorized_keys; the GTIG tool names are the strong signal.
Splunk
index=YOUR_ESXI_SYSLOG_INDEX earliest=1785542400 latest=now ("authorized_keys" OR "vmfs_browser" OR "vmfs-pydist" OR "tar.gz" OR "vmfs" OR "WinSCP" OR "scp")
| eval finding=case(match(_raw, "vmfs_browser[.]py|vmfs-pydist[.]tar[.]gz|(^|[/ \"])o[.]tar[.]gz"), "1 GTIG ESXi tool or archive", match(_raw, "/vmfs/volumes/[^/ ]+/[.]a([/ \"]|$)"), "2 hidden .a directory on VMFS", match(_raw, "authorized_keys"), "3 authorized_keys touched", match(_raw, "(?i)winscp|(^|[^a-z])scp -"), "4 WinSCP or scp session", true(), null())
| where isnotnull(finding)
| stats min(_time) AS first_seen count AS events latest(_raw) AS sample BY host finding
| sort finding
| convert ctime(first_seen)Elastic
FROM YOUR_ESXI_SYSLOG_INDEX
| WHERE @timestamp >= TO_DATETIME("2026-08-01T00:00:00Z")
| EVAL m = COALESCE(message, "")
| EVAL finding = CASE(m RLIKE ".*(vmfs_browser[.]py|vmfs-pydist[.]tar[.]gz).*|(.*[^-a-zA-Z0-9_.])?o[.]tar[.]gz.*", "1 GTIG ESXi tool or archive", m RLIKE ".*/vmfs/volumes/[^/ ]+/[.]a([^-a-zA-Z0-9_.].*)?", "2 hidden .a directory on VMFS", m RLIKE ".*authorized_keys.*", "3 authorized_keys touched", TO_LOWER(m) RLIKE ".*(winscp|scp -).*", "4 WinSCP or scp session", NULL)
| WHERE finding IS NOT NULL
| STATS first_seen = MIN(@timestamp), events = COUNT(*), sample = MAX(m) BY host.name, finding
| SORT findingCrowdStrike
// run in the repository or view that holds ESXi syslog; set the time picker to start at 2026-08-01 00:00 UTC
@rawstring=/authorized_keys|vmfs|tar\.gz|winscp|scp -/i
| case {
@rawstring=/vmfs_browser\.py|vmfs-pydist\.tar\.gz|(^|[\/ "])o\.tar\.gz/ | finding := "1 GTIG ESXi tool or archive" ;
@rawstring=/\/vmfs\/volumes\/[^\/ ]+\/\.a([\/ "]|$)/ | finding := "2 hidden .a directory on VMFS" ;
@rawstring=/authorized_keys/ | finding := "3 authorized_keys touched" ;
@rawstring=/winscp|(^|[^a-z])scp -/i | finding := "4 WinSCP or scp session" }
| groupBy([host, finding], function=[min(@timestamp, as=first_seen), count(as=events), selectLast([@rawstring])])
| sort(finding, order=asc)Microsoft KQL
Syslog
| where TimeGenerated >= datetime(2026-08-01T00:00:00Z)
| where SyslogMessage contains "authorized_keys" or SyslogMessage contains "vmfs" or SyslogMessage contains "tar.gz" or SyslogMessage contains "WinSCP" or SyslogMessage contains "scp"
| extend Finding = case(SyslogMessage matches regex @"vmfs_browser\.py|vmfs-pydist\.tar\.gz|(^|[/ ""])o\.tar\.gz", "1 GTIG ESXi tool or archive", SyslogMessage matches regex @"/vmfs/volumes/[^/ ]+/\.a([/ ""]|$)", "2 hidden .a directory on VMFS", SyslogMessage contains "authorized_keys", "3 authorized_keys touched", SyslogMessage matches regex @"(?i)winscp|(^|[^a-z])scp -", "4 WinSCP or scp session", "")
| where isnotempty(Finding)
| summarize FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), Events = count(), Sample = take_any(SyslogMessage) by Computer, Finding
| order by Finding ascIndicators from GTIG
Type | Indicator | GTIG description |
IPv4 | 103.147.251[.]5 | Suspected Obfuscation Network IP (Table 2) |
IPv4 | 103.190.38[.]3 | Suspected Obfuscation Network IP (Table 2) |
IPv4 | 118.174.128[.]34 | Suspected Obfuscation Network IP (Table 2) |
IPv4 | 118.174.128[.]36 | Suspected Obfuscation Network IP (Table 2) |
IPv4 | 118.174.128[.]38 | Suspected Obfuscation Network IP (Table 2) |
IPv4 | 176.9.89[.]66 | Suspected Obfuscation Network IP (Table 2) |
IPv4 | 185.71.15[.]109 | Suspected Obfuscation Network IP (Table 2) |
IPv4 | 220.121.128[.]41 | Suspected Obfuscation Network IP (Table 2) |
IPv4 | 222.108.77[.]44 | Suspected Obfuscation Network IP (Table 2) |
IPv4 | 61.216.56[.]127 | Suspected Obfuscation Network IP (Table 2) |
IPv4 | 81.45.89[.]43 | Suspected Obfuscation Network IP (Table 2) |
File | /tmp/123 | BONESAW, vCenter exploitation utility |
File | /tmp/sss | SAWSNAKE, SAML forging utility |
File | /tmp/dbr | BEARBONES, backdoored Dropbear SSH server |
File | /usr/bin/vmtoolscs | LAZYBONES, Slack backdoor |
File | ActiveSer.jsp | SLIMSAVAGE webshell |
File | u.jsp | CAGEMATCH staging webshell |
File | /tmp/123.key | SSH private key matching the key added on ESXi |
File | /tmp/gdb_file | gdb command file used to escalate to root |
File | /tmp/rar | Download written by curl |
File | /tmp/123.rar | Download written by curl |
File | /tmp/rsa_host_key | BEARBONES host key |
File | /tmp/ecdsa_host_key | BEARBONES host key |
File | /tmp/dss_host_key | BEARBONES host key |
URI path | /content/r.js | URI path of curl downloads, host redacted |
URI path | /rest/appliance/access/ssh | VAMI API path used to turn SSH on and off |
Account | sps- prefix in vsphere.local | Local administrator created by the actor, middle redacted |
SSH banner | SSH-2.0-pulsesecure_23345 | BEARBONES SSH banner |
Port | TCP 33992 | BEARBONES listener port |
Directory | .a | Hidden staging directory on a VMFS volume |
File | vmfs-pydist.tar.gz | ESXi staging archive |
File | vmfs_browser.py | Tool used to extract guest files |
File | o.tar.gz | Archive of extracted guest files |
Reading the results before you escalate
In our judgment, a verified sps- account warrants assuming vCenter compromise; a GTIG file path or BEARBONES banner warrants urgent review of that host and its vCenters. An unplanned SSH toggle or a new administrator is a lead until a second hunt hits the same appliance, and an IP hit alone is weaker still.
One next step
If your clients run on Microsoft 365, start with a free Inception Foresight M365 Assessment.



