GeoVision XMRig Attack Goes After Defender on Camera Servers


What this means for your clients: Attackers took over security camera computers anyone online could reach, went after their antivirus and mined cryptocurrency, so ask whoever runs your cameras whether that system is exposed and updated.
The Huntress SOC saw malicious activity at 13 organizations in various industries, mostly from November 8 to November 10, with a similar attack chain on most endpoints. Every case started with GeoStartupAgentService.exe, a GeoVision service, often running as SYSTEM. Shodan showed GeoVision devices or management interfaces open to the internet at the victims' external addresses.
The payload was a cryptominer, which makes this easy, and wrong, to shrug off. The camera server in the back closet is a Windows machine on your network, and here it handed a stranger a SYSTEM shell to impair the antivirus and install a loader built to survive blocklists. Huntress does not name the exploited flaw, and neither do we.
How the GeoVision XMRig attack works
The GeoVision service opened a command shell that ran a one-line PowerShell download of script a, which led to scripts b and c from the same server. Script a ran in memory, probed for writable folders and checked whether Microsoft Defender was active. Script b was written to disk, launched through WMI, and downloaded kvckiller.sys. VirusTotal identifies it as wsftprm.sys, a kernel driver already abused in BYOVD attacks, where attackers bring a vulnerable driver to tamper with security tools.
The attackers also set three IFEO Debugger values. Image File Execution Options is a Windows troubleshooting feature that launches a "debugger" whenever a named program starts. Here it redirected MsMpEng.exe, the Defender engine, plus SecurityHealthService.exe and SecurityHealthSystray.exe to systray.exe, likely to keep them from starting.
Script c fetched update.exe, a custom Golang loader. It talked to an address tied to a domain registered on November 7 and carries a BitTorrent Mainline DHT client and a PKARR resolver, so the operator can publish new server addresses under a public key. On some hosts it created scheduled tasks named PackageUpdater, rerunning it every 15 minutes, and PackageUpdater_Startup, running at boot as SYSTEM. The loader also downloaded XMRig as ApplyUpdate.exe.
Why a miner should still worry you
The miner steals compute, and GeoVision says infected servers show unexplained, heavy CPU load. The path matters more. Someone ran code as SYSTEM on a box few teams watch, tried to tamper with security tools, and installed command and control the operator can move without registering a domain. In our judgment, swapping the miner for ransomware would change nothing else in this chain. Huntress says camera management software belongs in the enterprise attack surface, and for MSPs that means the NVR is in scope even if another vendor installed it.
Close the exposure, then clean up
GeoVision published an advisory (GV-SFW-2026-11-01) on November 12, listing these fixed versions for GV-VMS systems with the WebCam Server feature enabled. Neither GeoVision nor Huntress cites the other, so the link is our judgment.
GV-VMS V20: update to V20.1.3.
GV-VMS V18.3.5: apply patch V18.3.5.25.
GV-VMS V17.4.8: apply patch V17.4.8.65.
Patching is half the job. As Huntress advises, put GeoVision devices and management interfaces behind a VPN or restrict them to trusted IP addresses. Scan your external addresses as an attacker would. Segment camera servers. If you find compromise, isolate the host and preserve evidence before removing files or changing settings. GeoVision's advisory points compromised users to a Malware Removal Guide. In our view, cleanup means removing both tasks, the IFEO values, the driver and dropped files.
Our advice for the driver step: keep the Microsoft vulnerable driver blocklist on, enable memory integrity (HVCI) where hardware allows, and turn on the rule "Block abuse of exploited vulnerable signed drivers". Microsoft says the blocklist will not catch every vulnerable driver. Enable tamper protection too. Block the listed indicators, but expect the loader to find new servers.
How to hunt
We have not run these in a live SIEM; tune them to your field names and test before trusting a clean result. Every search comes in Splunk, Elastic, CrowdStrike and Microsoft KQL versions. We start hunts at 2026-11-01T00:00:00Z, so widen them if retention allows. Splunk assumes Sysmon, Elastic assumes Elastic Defend unless noted, and KQL assumes Defender for Endpoint. Confirm registry, driver and DNS coverage before reading silence as clean. Every YOUR_ name is a placeholder; host lists come from Test 1.
Test 1: which hosts run GeoVision software
Every host this returns is in scope.
Field mapping: each version also matches parent names, but a long-running service with no children slips past, so add known camera servers.
Splunk
index=YOUR_SYSMON_INDEX (source="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" OR sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational") EventCode=1 earliest=-30d latest=now
| eval proc=lower(mvindex(split(Image, "\\"), -1)), parent=lower(mvindex(split(ParentImage, "\\"), -1))
| where in(proc, "geostartupagentservice.exe", "webcamserver.exe") OR in(parent, "geostartupagentservice.exe", "webcamserver.exe")
| stats count AS events values(proc) AS processes values(parent) AS parents max(_time) AS last_seen BY host
| convert ctime(last_seen)Elastic
FROM logs-endpoint.events.process-*
| WHERE @timestamp >= NOW() - 30 days AND event.action == "start"
| EVAL proc = TO_LOWER(process.name), parent = TO_LOWER(process.parent.name)
| WHERE proc IN ("geostartupagentservice.exe", "webcamserver.exe") OR parent IN ("geostartupagentservice.exe", "webcamserver.exe")
| STATS events = COUNT(*), processes = VALUES(process.name), last_seen = MAX(@timestamp) BY host.name
| SORT host.nameCrowdStrike
// set the time picker to the last 30 days
#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2
| FileName=/^(GeoStartupAgentService|WebCamServer)\.exe$/i or ParentBaseFileName=/^(GeoStartupAgentService|WebCamServer)\.exe$/i
| groupBy([aid], function=[count(as=events), collect([FileName, ParentBaseFileName]), max(@timestamp, as=last_seen)])Microsoft KQL
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where FileName in~ ("GeoStartupAgentService.exe", "WebCamServer.exe") or InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("GeoStartupAgentService.exe", "WebCamServer.exe")
| summarize Events = count(), Processes = make_set(FileName, 20), LastSeen = max(Timestamp) by DeviceName
| order by DeviceName ascHunt 1: shells from the GeoVision service
Huntress advises hunting shells or PowerShell from GeoStartupAgentService.exe. We added WebCamServer.exe and PowerShell launched through WMI on GeoVision hosts.
Field mapping: CrowdStrike matches basenames in ParentBaseFileName and FileName, with sensor IDs as the host list.
False positives: GeoVision starts its own helpers, so children are limited to shells and script hosts.
Splunk
index=YOUR_SYSMON_INDEX (source="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" OR sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational") EventCode=1 earliest=1793491200 latest=now
| eval parent=lower(mvindex(split(ParentImage, "\\"), -1)), child=lower(mvindex(split(Image, "\\"), -1))
| where (in(parent, "geostartupagentservice.exe", "webcamserver.exe") AND in(child, "cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "wmic.exe", "mshta.exe", "rundll32.exe", "certutil.exe")) OR (parent=="wmiprvse.exe" AND in(child, "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe") AND in(host, "YOUR_GEOVISION_HOST1", "YOUR_GEOVISION_HOST2"))
| fillnull value="unknown" User
| stats count AS runs values(CommandLine) AS commands min(_time) AS first_seen max(_time) AS last_seen BY host User parent child
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)Elastic
FROM logs-endpoint.events.process-*
| WHERE @timestamp >= TO_DATETIME("2026-11-01T00:00:00.000Z") AND event.action == "start"
| EVAL parent = TO_LOWER(process.parent.name), child = TO_LOWER(process.name)
| WHERE (parent IN ("geostartupagentservice.exe", "webcamserver.exe") AND child IN ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "wmic.exe", "mshta.exe", "rundll32.exe", "certutil.exe")) OR (parent == "wmiprvse.exe" AND child IN ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe") AND host.name IN ("YOUR_GEOVISION_HOST1", "YOUR_GEOVISION_HOST2"))
| STATS runs = COUNT(*), commands = VALUES(process.command_line), first_seen = MIN(@timestamp), last_seen = MAX(@timestamp) BY host.name, user.name, parent, childCrowdStrike
// set the time picker to start on or before 2026-11-01
#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2
| test(@timestamp >= 1793491200000)
| case {
ParentBaseFileName=/^(GeoStartupAgentService|WebCamServer)\.exe$/i | FileName=/^(cmd|powershell|pwsh|wmic|mshta|rundll32|certutil)\.exe$/i ;
ParentBaseFileName=/^WmiPrvSE\.exe$/i | FileName=/^(powershell|pwsh)\.exe$/i | in(field="aid", values=["YOUR_GEOVISION_AID1", "YOUR_GEOVISION_AID2"]) }
| default(field=UserName, value="unknown")
| groupBy([aid, UserName, ParentBaseFileName, FileName], function=[count(as=runs), collect([CommandLine]), min(@timestamp, as=first_seen), max(@timestamp, as=last_seen)])Microsoft KQL
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp >= datetime(2026-11-01T00:00:00Z)
| where (InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("GeoStartupAgentService.exe", "WebCamServer.exe") and FileName in~ ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "wmic.exe", "mshta.exe", "rundll32.exe", "certutil.exe"))
or (InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "WmiPrvSE.exe" and FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe") and DeviceName in~ ("YOUR_GEOVISION_HOST1", "YOUR_GEOVISION_HOST2"))
| summarize Runs = count(), Commands = make_set(ProcessCommandLine, 50), FirstSeen = min(Timestamp), LastSeen = max(Timestamp) by DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileNameHunt 2: download cradles and the listed infrastructure
We chose to hunt PowerShell download cradles on every host, plus traffic or lookups involving the published addresses and domain.
Field mapping: Falcon network and DNS events carry ContextProcessId, not a process name, so pivot on it.
False positives: some admin scripts use the same pattern, so check the URL.
Splunk
index=YOUR_SYSMON_INDEX (source="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" OR sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational") (EventCode=1 OR EventCode=3 OR EventCode=22) earliest=1793491200 latest=now
| eval cl=lower(CommandLine), q=lower(QueryName)
| where (EventCode==1 AND like(cl, "%net.webclient%") AND (like(cl, "%downloadstring%") OR like(cl, "%iex%"))) OR (EventCode==3 AND (in(DestinationIp, "45.32.117.34", "2.59.133.151", "156.246.94.183") OR in(SourceIp, "45.32.117.34", "2.59.133.151", "156.246.94.183"))) OR (EventCode==22 AND match(q, "(^|[.])cctv-update[.]top$"))
| eval indicator=case(EventCode==1, "cradle", EventCode==3, if(in(DestinationIp, "45.32.117.34", "2.59.133.151", "156.246.94.183"), DestinationIp, SourceIp), EventCode==22, QueryName)
| stats count AS hits values(Image) AS processes values(CommandLine) AS commands min(_time) AS first_seen max(_time) AS last_seen BY host EventCode indicator
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)Elastic
FROM logs-endpoint.events.process-*, logs-endpoint.events.network-*
| WHERE @timestamp >= TO_DATETIME("2026-11-01T00:00:00.000Z")
| EVAL cl = TO_LOWER(process.command_line), q = TO_LOWER(dns.question.name)
| WHERE (event.dataset == "endpoint.events.process" AND cl LIKE "*net.webclient*" AND (cl LIKE "*downloadstring*" OR cl LIKE "*iex*"))
OR CIDR_MATCH(destination.ip, "45.32.117.34/32", "2.59.133.151/32", "156.246.94.183/32")
OR CIDR_MATCH(source.ip, "45.32.117.34/32", "2.59.133.151/32", "156.246.94.183/32")
OR q RLIKE """(.*\.)?cctv-update\.top"""
| STATS hits = COUNT(*), commands = VALUES(process.command_line), first_seen = MIN(@timestamp), last_seen = MAX(@timestamp) BY host.name, event.dataset, process.name, source.ip, destination.ip, dns.question.nameCrowdStrike
// set the time picker to start on or before 2026-11-01
#event_simpleName=/^(ProcessRollup2|NetworkConnectIP4|NetworkReceiveAcceptIP4|DnsRequest)$/
| test(@timestamp >= 1793491200000)
| case {
#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2 | CommandLine=/net\.webclient/i | CommandLine=/(downloadstring|iex)/i | indicator := "cradle" ;
#event_simpleName=/^Network/ | RemoteAddressIP4=/^(45\.32\.117\.34|2\.59\.133\.151|156\.246\.94\.183)$/ | indicator := RemoteAddressIP4 ;
#event_simpleName=DnsRequest | DomainName=/(^|\.)cctv-update\.top$/i | indicator := DomainName }
| default(field=[FileName, CommandLine, ContextProcessId], value="n/a")
| groupBy([aid, #event_simpleName, indicator], function=[count(as=hits), collect([FileName, CommandLine, ContextProcessId]), min(@timestamp, as=first_seen), max(@timestamp, as=last_seen)])Microsoft KQL
let iocs = dynamic(["45.32.117.34", "2.59.133.151", "156.246.94.183"]);
union
(DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp >= datetime(2026-11-01T00:00:00Z)
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "net.webclient" and (ProcessCommandLine has "downloadstring" or ProcessCommandLine has "iex")
| extend Indicator = "cradle", Command = ProcessCommandLine),
(DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp >= datetime(2026-11-01T00:00:00Z)
| where RemoteIP in (iocs) or RemoteUrl has "cctv-update.top" or (ActionType == "DnsConnectionInspected" and tostring(AdditionalFields) has "cctv-update.top")
| extend Indicator = iff(RemoteIP in (iocs), RemoteIP, "cctv-update.top"), Command = InitiatingProcessCommandLine),
(DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp >= datetime(2026-11-01T00:00:00Z)
| where ActionType == "DnsQueryResponse" and tostring(AdditionalFields) has "cctv-update.top"
| extend Indicator = "cctv-update.top", Command = InitiatingProcessCommandLine)
| summarize Hits = count(), Commands = make_set(Command, 20), FirstSeen = min(Timestamp), LastSeen = max(Timestamp) by DeviceName, Indicator, InitiatingProcessFileNameHunt 3: IFEO Debugger values on Defender components
This finds Debugger values that target Defender's three programs or name systray.exe.
Field mapping: Sysmon event 13 only appears if your configuration watches this key, and Falcon registry event names vary by sensor policy.
False positives: rare for the named programs, but the systray.exe match can catch SecurityHealthSystray, so read the value.
Splunk
index=YOUR_SYSMON_INDEX (source="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" OR sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational") EventCode=13 earliest=1793491200 latest=now
| eval key=lower(TargetObject), val=lower(Details)
| where match(key, "\\\\image file execution options\\\\[^\\\\]+\\\\debugger$") AND (match(key, "\\\\(msmpeng|securityhealthservice|securityhealthsystray)[.]exe\\\\debugger$") OR match(val, "systray[.]exe"))
| stats count AS writes values(Details) AS debugger values(Image) AS writer min(_time) AS first_seen max(_time) AS last_seen BY host TargetObject
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)Elastic
FROM logs-endpoint.events.registry-*
| WHERE @timestamp >= TO_DATETIME("2026-11-01T00:00:00.000Z")
| EVAL rp = TO_LOWER(registry.path), data = TO_LOWER(MV_CONCAT(registry.data.strings, " "))
| WHERE rp LIKE """*\\image file execution options\\*\\debugger"""
AND (rp RLIKE """.*\\(msmpeng|securityhealthservice|securityhealthsystray)\.exe\\debugger""" OR data LIKE "*systray.exe*")
| STATS writes = COUNT(*), debugger = VALUES(registry.data.strings), writer = VALUES(process.name), first_seen = MIN(@timestamp), last_seen = MAX(@timestamp) BY host.name, registry.pathCrowdStrike
// set the time picker to start on or before 2026-11-01
#event_simpleName=/^(AsepValueUpdate|RegGenericValueUpdate)$/
| test(@timestamp >= 1793491200000)
| RegObjectName=/\\Image File Execution Options\\/i
| RegValueName=/^Debugger$/i
| RegObjectName=/\\(MsMpEng|SecurityHealthService|SecurityHealthSystray)\.exe$/i or RegStringValue=/systray\.exe/i
| default(field=RegStringValue, value="none")
| groupBy([aid, RegObjectName, RegStringValue], function=[count(as=writes), min(@timestamp, as=first_seen), max(@timestamp, as=last_seen)])Microsoft KQL
DeviceRegistryEvents
| where Timestamp >= datetime(2026-11-01T00:00:00Z)
| where ActionType == "RegistryValueSet" and RegistryValueName =~ "Debugger"
| where RegistryKey has "Image File Execution Options"
| where RegistryKey has_any ("MsMpEng.exe", "SecurityHealthService.exe", "SecurityHealthSystray.exe") or RegistryValueData has "systray.exe"
| summarize Writes = count(), Writers = make_set(InitiatingProcessFileName, 10), FirstSeen = min(Timestamp), LastSeen = max(Timestamp) by DeviceName, RegistryKey, RegistryValueDataHunt 4: the vulnerable driver
This catches kvckiller.sys or wsftprm.sys by name or hash, and kernel drivers loaded or installed from user-writable folders. That path test is ours; Huntress does not say where the driver landed.
Field mapping: Splunk and Elastic pair Sysmon event 6 with System event 7045, while Falcon and Defender test the path on the load event.
False positives: some hardware utilities unpack drivers into Temp, so confirm the publisher.
Splunk
(index=YOUR_SYSMON_INDEX (source="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" OR sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational") EventCode=6) OR (index=YOUR_WINDOWS_INDEX source="XmlWinEventLog:System" EventCode=7045) earliest=1793491200 latest=now
| eval drv=lower(coalesce(ImageLoaded, ImagePath, ServiceFileName)), h=lower(Hashes), stype=lower(ServiceType)
| where match(drv, "(kvckiller|wsftprm)[.]sys") OR like(h, "%ff5dbdcf6d7ae5d97b6f3ef412df0b977ba4a844c45b30ca78c0eeb2653d69a8%") OR (match(drv, "[.]sys") AND match(drv, "\\\\(users|programdata|temp)\\\\") AND (EventCode==6 OR like(stype, "%kernel%")))
| fillnull value="n/a" drv
| stats count AS events values(Signature) AS signer min(_time) AS first_seen max(_time) AS last_seen BY host EventCode drv
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)Elastic
FROM logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*, logs-system.system-*
| WHERE @timestamp >= TO_DATETIME("2026-11-01T00:00:00.000Z") AND event.code IN ("6", "7045")
| EVAL drv = TO_LOWER(COALESCE(file.path, winlog.event_data.ImagePath)), stype = TO_LOWER(winlog.event_data.ServiceType)
| WHERE drv RLIKE """.*(kvckiller|wsftprm)\.sys.*"""
OR file.hash.sha256 == "ff5dbdcf6d7ae5d97b6f3ef412df0b977ba4a844c45b30ca78c0eeb2653d69a8"
OR (drv RLIKE """.*\\(users|programdata|temp)\\.*\.sys.*""" AND (event.code == "6" OR stype LIKE "*kernel*"))
| STATS events = COUNT(*), first_seen = MIN(@timestamp), last_seen = MAX(@timestamp) BY host.name, event.code, drvCrowdStrike
// set the time picker to start on or before 2026-11-01
#event_simpleName=DriverLoad
| test(@timestamp >= 1793491200000)
| ImageFileName=/(kvckiller|wsftprm)\.sys$/i or SHA256HashData="ff5dbdcf6d7ae5d97b6f3ef412df0b977ba4a844c45b30ca78c0eeb2653d69a8" or ImageFileName=/\\(Users|ProgramData|Temp)\\.*\.sys$/i
| default(field=SHA256HashData, value="n/a")
| groupBy([aid, ImageFileName, SHA256HashData], function=[count(as=loads), min(@timestamp, as=first_seen), max(@timestamp, as=last_seen)])Microsoft KQL
DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp >= datetime(2026-11-01T00:00:00Z)
| where ActionType == "DriverLoad"
| where FileName in~ ("kvckiller.sys", "wsftprm.sys") or SHA256 == "ff5dbdcf6d7ae5d97b6f3ef412df0b977ba4a844c45b30ca78c0eeb2653d69a8"
or (FileName endswith ".sys" and FolderPath matches regex @"(?i)\\(users|programdata|temp)\\")
| summarize Events = count(), Initiators = make_set(InitiatingProcessFileName, 10), FirstSeen = min(Timestamp), LastSeen = max(Timestamp) by DeviceName, ActionType, FolderPath, FileName, SHA256Hunt 5: the loader and its scheduled tasks
This covers the PackageUpdater tasks, schtasks /Create from update.exe, update.exe in systemprofile, ApplyUpdate.exe and both hashes.
Field mapping: Security event 4698 needs object access auditing, and only Elastic and KQL check the script hash, on written files.
False positives: both file names are common, so weigh the folder.
Splunk
(index=YOUR_SYSMON_INDEX (source="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" OR sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational") EventCode=1) OR (index=YOUR_WINDOWS_INDEX source="XmlWinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4698) earliest=1793491200 latest=now
| eval img=lower(Image), parent=lower(mvindex(split(ParentImage, "\\"), -1)), cl=lower(CommandLine), h=lower(Hashes), task=lower(TaskName)
| where match(task, "packageupdater(_startup)?$") OR match(cl, "packageupdater") OR (parent=="update.exe" AND match(img, "\\\\schtasks[.]exe$") AND match(cl, "/create")) OR match(img, "\\\\config\\\\systemprofile\\\\update[.]exe$") OR match(img, "\\\\applyupdate[.]exe$") OR like(h, "%f1235751c9e48e5732b7b183dc2bb175a19e4c6401dfd0e96b4cfdd0d8c54b4c%")
| fillnull value="n/a" Image
| stats count AS events values(TaskName) AS tasks values(CommandLine) AS commands min(_time) AS first_seen max(_time) AS last_seen BY host EventCode Image
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)Elastic
FROM logs-endpoint.events.process-*, logs-endpoint.events.file-*
| WHERE @timestamp >= TO_DATETIME("2026-11-01T00:00:00.000Z")
| EVAL exe = TO_LOWER(process.executable), parent = TO_LOWER(process.parent.name), cl = TO_LOWER(process.command_line), fp = TO_LOWER(file.path)
| WHERE cl LIKE "*packageupdater*"
OR fp LIKE """*\\system32\\tasks\\packageupdater*"""
OR (parent == "update.exe" AND exe LIKE """*\\schtasks.exe""" AND cl LIKE "*/create*")
OR exe LIKE """*\\config\\systemprofile\\update.exe""" OR fp LIKE """*\\config\\systemprofile\\update.exe"""
OR exe LIKE """*\\applyupdate.exe""" OR fp LIKE """*\\applyupdate.exe"""
OR process.hash.sha256 IN ("f1235751c9e48e5732b7b183dc2bb175a19e4c6401dfd0e96b4cfdd0d8c54b4c", "b673c4d707828abedc767a2be6badef7454492e62c37e30cf3cc5a402fd3647b")
OR file.hash.sha256 IN ("f1235751c9e48e5732b7b183dc2bb175a19e4c6401dfd0e96b4cfdd0d8c54b4c", "b673c4d707828abedc767a2be6badef7454492e62c37e30cf3cc5a402fd3647b")
| STATS events = COUNT(*), commands = VALUES(process.command_line), files = VALUES(file.path), first_seen = MIN(@timestamp), last_seen = MAX(@timestamp) BY host.name, event.dataset, process.nameCrowdStrike
// set the time picker to start on or before 2026-11-01
#event_simpleName=/^(ProcessRollup2|ScheduledTaskRegistered)$/
| test(@timestamp >= 1793491200000)
| case {
#event_simpleName=ScheduledTaskRegistered | TaskName=/PackageUpdater(_Startup)?$/i | hit := "task" ;
#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2 | ParentBaseFileName=/^update\.exe$/i | FileName=/^schtasks\.exe$/i | CommandLine=/\/create/i | hit := "schtasks from update.exe" ;
#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2 | ImageFileName=/\\config\\systemprofile\\update\.exe$/i | hit := "update.exe in systemprofile" ;
#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2 | FileName=/^ApplyUpdate\.exe$/i | hit := "ApplyUpdate.exe" ;
#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2 | in(field="SHA256HashData", values=["f1235751c9e48e5732b7b183dc2bb175a19e4c6401dfd0e96b4cfdd0d8c54b4c"]) | hit := "hash" }
| default(field=[TaskName, TaskExecCommand, ImageFileName, CommandLine], value="n/a")
| groupBy([aid, hit], function=[count(as=events), collect([TaskName, TaskExecCommand, ImageFileName, CommandLine]), min(@timestamp, as=first_seen), max(@timestamp, as=last_seen)])Microsoft KQL
let hashes = dynamic(["f1235751c9e48e5732b7b183dc2bb175a19e4c6401dfd0e96b4cfdd0d8c54b4c", "b673c4d707828abedc767a2be6badef7454492e62c37e30cf3cc5a402fd3647b"]);
union
(DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp >= datetime(2026-11-01T00:00:00Z)
| where ActionType == "ScheduledTaskCreated" and AdditionalFields has "PackageUpdater"
| extend Hit = "task"),
(DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp >= datetime(2026-11-01T00:00:00Z)
| where (InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "update.exe" and FileName =~ "schtasks.exe" and ProcessCommandLine contains "/create")
or (FileName =~ "update.exe" and FolderPath contains @"\config\systemprofile") or FileName =~ "ApplyUpdate.exe" or SHA256 in (hashes)
| extend Hit = "process"),
(DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp >= datetime(2026-11-01T00:00:00Z)
| where SHA256 in (hashes) or (FileName =~ "update.exe" and FolderPath contains @"\config\systemprofile") or FileName =~ "ApplyUpdate.exe"
| extend Hit = "file")
| summarize Events = count(), FirstSeen = min(Timestamp), LastSeen = max(Timestamp) by DeviceName, Hit, FileName, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessFileNameHunt 6: hardcoded resolvers and DHT traffic
Huntress suggests these from its analysis of update.exe: DNS to 8.8.8.8, 8.8.4.4 or 1.1.1.1 from anything but the Windows DNS client, and outbound UDP DHT from a GeoVision server or WebCamServer.exe.
Field mapping: the DNS client runs in svchost.exe, so that is excluded, and Falcon skips processes started before the time picker.
False positives: some tools query public resolvers directly, and DHT can use any port; 6881 to 6889 is our choice, as Huntress says 6881 or similar.
Splunk
index=YOUR_SYSMON_INDEX (source="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" OR sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational") EventCode=3 Initiated=true earliest=1793491200 latest=now
| eval proc=coalesce(lower(mvindex(split(Image, "\\"), -1)), "unknown"), dport=tonumber(DestinationPort)
| where (in(DestinationIp, "8.8.8.8", "8.8.4.4", "1.1.1.1") AND dport==53 AND proc!="svchost.exe") OR (lower(Protocol)=="udp" AND dport>=6881 AND dport<=6889 AND (proc=="webcamserver.exe" OR in(host, "YOUR_GEOVISION_HOST1", "YOUR_GEOVISION_HOST2")))
| stats count AS connections values(DestinationPort) AS ports min(_time) AS first_seen max(_time) AS last_seen BY host proc DestinationIp
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)Elastic
FROM logs-endpoint.events.network-*
| WHERE @timestamp >= TO_DATETIME("2026-11-01T00:00:00.000Z") AND network.direction IN ("egress", "outgoing")
| EVAL proc = COALESCE(TO_LOWER(process.name), "unknown")
| WHERE (CIDR_MATCH(destination.ip, "8.8.8.8/32", "8.8.4.4/32", "1.1.1.1/32") AND destination.port == 53 AND proc != "svchost.exe")
OR (network.transport == "udp" AND destination.port >= 6881 AND destination.port <= 6889 AND (proc == "webcamserver.exe" OR host.name IN ("YOUR_GEOVISION_HOST1", "YOUR_GEOVISION_HOST2")))
| STATS connections = COUNT(*), ports = VALUES(destination.port), first_seen = MIN(@timestamp), last_seen = MAX(@timestamp) BY host.name, proc, destination.ipCrowdStrike
// set the time picker to start well before 2026-11-01, ideally before the host's last boot, so process names resolve
#event_simpleName=/^(ProcessRollup2|NetworkConnectIP4)$/
| case {
#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2 | ContextProcessId := TargetProcessId | proc := FileName ;
#event_simpleName=NetworkConnectIP4 | test(@timestamp >= 1793491200000) | RemotePort=53 | RemoteAddressIP4=/^(8\.8\.8\.8|8\.8\.4\.4|1\.1\.1\.1)$/ | resolver := 1 ;
#event_simpleName=NetworkConnectIP4 | test(@timestamp >= 1793491200000) | Protocol=17 | test(RemotePort >= 6881) | test(RemotePort <= 6889) | dht := 1 }
| selfJoinFilter(field=[aid, ContextProcessId], where=[{#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2}, {#event_simpleName=NetworkConnectIP4}])
| groupBy([aid, ContextProcessId], function=[collect([proc, RemoteAddressIP4, RemotePort]), count(RemotePort, as=connections), sum(resolver, as=resolver_hits), sum(dht, as=dht_hits), max(@timestamp, as=last_seen)], limit=max)
| default(field=[resolver_hits, dht_hits], value=0)
| default(field=proc, value="unresolved")
| case {
test(resolver_hits > 0) | proc!=/^svchost\.exe$/i | proc!="unresolved" ;
test(dht_hits > 0) | proc=/^WebCamServer\.exe$/i ;
test(dht_hits > 0) | in(field="aid", values=["YOUR_GEOVISION_AID1", "YOUR_GEOVISION_AID2"]) }Microsoft KQL
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp >= datetime(2026-11-01T00:00:00Z)
| where (RemoteIP in ("8.8.8.8", "8.8.4.4", "1.1.1.1") and RemotePort == 53 and InitiatingProcessFileName !~ "svchost.exe")
or (Protocol =~ "udp" and RemotePort between (6881 .. 6889) and (InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "WebCamServer.exe" or DeviceName in~ ("YOUR_GEOVISION_HOST1", "YOUR_GEOVISION_HOST2")))
| summarize Connections = count(), Ports = make_set(RemotePort), FirstSeen = min(Timestamp), LastSeen = max(Timestamp) by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RemoteIPIndicators from Huntress
Type | Indicator | Huntress description |
IPv4 | 2.59.133[.]151 | WebCamServer.exe observed reaching out to this IP. Likely source of exploitation |
IPv4 | 45.32.117[.]34 | IP that PowerShell scripts (a, b, and c) were launched from |
IPv4 | 156.246.94[.]183 | IP address that the custom Golang loader (update.exe) was reaching out to |
Domain | cctv-update[.]top | The IP 156.246.94[.]183 resolved to this domain (registered Nov 7 at 02:40 UTC) |
SHA256 | b673c4d707828abedc767a2be6badef7454492e62c37e30cf3cc5a402fd3647b | PowerShell scripts observed in the attacks (Huntress lists one hash for a, b, c) |
SHA256 | ff5dbdcf6d7ae5d97b6f3ef412df0b977ba4a844c45b30ca78c0eeb2653d69a8 | wsftprm.sys / Kvckiller.sys, vulnerable driver abused in incident |
SHA256 | f1235751c9e48e5732b7b183dc2bb175a19e4c6401dfd0e96b4cfdd0d8c54b4c | update.exe, Golang binary |
File | ApplyUpdate.exe | XMRig miner |
Scheduled tasks | PackageUpdater, PackageUpdater_Startup | Scheduled tasks |
Path | C:\WINDOWS\system32\config\systemprofile\update.exe | Executed by PackageUpdater every 15 minutes |
Reading the results before you escalate
Test 1 is inventory, but any internet-reachable host it returns needs patching today.
A Hunt 1 hit means a GeoVision service started a shell, or WMI started PowerShell on a GeoVision host, so stop calling this a miner problem. Unless your team ran it, assume an attacker did; isolate the host and preserve evidence. A Hunt 3 hit means Defender may never have started, so a clean scan there proves nothing. A Hunt 4 name or hash hit means the driver reached that host, and in our view it should be rebuilt, not cleaned. Hunt 5 hits suggest persistence, but deleting tasks before closing the exposure invites the next run.
Hunt 6 alone is a lead, because plenty of software ships its own resolver; it matters alongside Hunts 1 to 5. Escalate to incident response when any hunt ties back to a GeoVision host, and treat everything it could reach as in scope.
One next step
If your clients run on Microsoft 365, start with a free Inception Foresight M365 Assessment.



