7 Azure Security Gaps Most Companies Overlook (And How to Fix Them)

If you run Microsoft 365 and Azure, your biggest risk isn’t a zero‑day—it’s misconfiguration. Tenant compromises are frequently the result of compromised privileged accounts, which is why Microsoft stresses dedicated admin identities, MFA, and least privilege. Meanwhile, attackers still hammer the front door with automation: over 97% of credential stuffing and 99%+ of password spray attacks target legacy authentication that doesn’t support MFA. These are preventable.

In this guide, we’ll walk through seven overlooked security gaps we routinely find in Microsoft 365 & Azure, show you how to check for each one, and explain how to fix them with the Microsoft‑native tools you already own. When you’re ready, get a no‑cost assessment to see exactly where your environment stands.

Why Misconfigurations Are a Silent Threat in Microsoft 365 & Azure

• Privilege is power. Microsoft documents that tenant breaches often begin with a compromised privileged account—hence the emphasis on dedicated cloud‑only admin identities, MFA, and Zero Trust controls.

• Legacy auth is low‑hanging fruit. According to Microsoft, >97% of credential stuffing and >99% of password spray attacks rely on legacy auth—and would be stopped if legacy auth were blocked.

  
  

The 7 Overlooked Azure Security Gaps (and How to Fix Them)

1) Conditional Access policies stuck in Report‑only (never enforced)

What it is: You drafted Conditional Access (CA) policies and set them to Report‑only for testing—but never flipped them On. Report‑only evaluates and logs policy outcomes, but doesn’t protect users.

Why it matters: You believe MFA, device compliance, or location controls are enforced—but they aren’t.

How to check: Use the Conditional Access insights & reporting workbook to assess policy impact (per‑policy, per‑user, per‑app) before enforcement.

How to fix:

• Validate in the workbook, stage rollout (pilot → expand), then set policies to On.

• When testing device compliance in Report‑only, follow Microsoft’s note to prevent repeated prompts on macOS/iOS/Android by excluding those platforms during evaluation.

Pro tip: Start from Microsoft’s CA templates (e.g., “Require compliant device”), and maintain a clear naming convention for admin clarity.

2) Over‑permissive admin roles (and Global Admins without MFA)

What it is: Everyday accounts holding Global Administrator or other high‑impact roles; permanent standing access; or missing MFA enforcement for admins. Microsoft recommends least privilege, MFA on all admin roles, and Privileged Identity Management (PIM) for just‑in‑time access.

Why it matters: If a privileged identity is compromised, the attack blast radius is tenant‑wide. Microsoft outlines practices for protecting privileged accounts and stresses Zero Trust identity protections.

How to check: Inventory who holds privileged roles, verify MFA enforcement on those roles, and identify permanent versus eligible (PIM) assignments.

How to fix:

• Reassign privileges using Microsoft’s least‑privileged‑roles‑by‑task mapping.

• Create a dedicated CA policy requiring MFA for administrator roles; use PIM with approvals, time limits, and justification.

Pro tip: Maintain break‑glass emergency accounts and monitor their use. Don’t exempt day‑to‑day admin identities from CA protections.

3) Legacy authentication still enabled somewhere

What it is: Old protocols (e.g., Basic auth for IMAP/POP/SMTP) that don’t support MFA remain enabled for some users, devices, or service accounts. Microsoft recommends blocking legacy auth (or using Security Defaults).

Why it matters: Microsoft’s telemetry shows the overwhelming majority of credential abuse rides on legacy auth. One lingering exception can bypass your modern controls.

How to check:

• In Sign‑in logs, filter by Client app = Legacy to find remaining usage.

How to fix:

• Deploy the “Block legacy authentication” CA policy: start in Report‑only → validate → set On. If you don’t use CA, enable Security Defaults.

Pro tip: Review service accounts/devices that still depend on legacy protocols and plan migration to modern auth; treat app passwords as a temporary bridge only.

4) Identity risk policies (Entra ID Protection) not configured

What it is: Risk‑based policies that challenge or block risky sign‑ins and users (e.g., malicious IPs, impossible travel, leaked credentials) aren’t enabled or tuned.

Why it matters: Adaptive enforcement adds a dynamic shield on top of static CA conditions. Microsoft recommends requiring secure password change for High user risk and MFA/block for risky sign‑ins.

How to check: In Entra admin center → Protection, confirm User risk and Sign‑in risk policies and ensure MFA/SSPR registration coverage.

How to fix:

• User risk → High = require secure password change (with password writeback).

• Sign‑in risk → Medium/High = MFA or block. Ensure MFA registration is enforced.

Pro tip: Pair risk policies with Conditional Access so high‑risk events prompt step‑up authentication or are blocked in real time.

5) No alerting on privileged role changes (PIM alerts/notifications not enabled)

What it is: Privileged Identity Management can raise built‑in alerts (e.g., “roles assigned outside PIM,” “too many owners”) and send emails for assignments/activations—but many tenants don’t enable or monitor them.

Why it matters: Silent privilege escalation is a common attacker move. Alerts provide near‑real‑time visibility to investigate and contain.

How to check: Entra ID Governance → PIM → Alerts to verify which alerts and notifications are active and who receives them.

How to fix:

• Enable key PIM alerts and validate email routing to security mailboxes/Teams/ticketing.

Pro tip: Manage and review PIM alerts programmatically using Microsoft Graph for continuous assurance.

6) Unsecured service principals & app registrations

What it is: Applications and service principals with excessive Graph permissions, long‑lived secrets, or permissive admin consent. Microsoft documents security best practices for app registrations (secrets, certificates, consent, and scopes).

Why it matters: Workload identities don’t get MFA prompts and often have durable, broad access—making them “keys to the kingdom” if compromised.

How to check:

• Inventory app permissions (e.g., Directory.ReadWrite.All), secret ages/expirations, and who can grant tenant‑wide admin consent.

  
  

How to fix:

• Reduce to least‑privileged scopes, rotate/expire secrets, and control admin consent via policy and review. Use Microsoft’s security properties guidance for app registrations.

  
  

Pro tip: Map tasks to least‑privileged Entra roles (e.g., Application/Cloud Application Administrator) instead of Global Admin wherever possible.

7) Microsoft Sentinel not fully leveraged (analytics & automation gaps)

What it is: Data is connected to Microsoft Sentinel, but Content hub solutions, custom analytics rules, and SOAR automation (automation rules & playbooks) aren’t fully deployed.

Why it matters: Without tuned analytics and automation, your SIEM turns into a log warehouse—incidents go untriaged and response slows. Microsoft provides prescriptive guidance for scheduled analytics rules and automation rules.

How to check:

• Confirm relevant Content hub solutions are installed and scheduled analytics are enabled (not just created).

How to fix:

• Customize KQL detections; use automation rules to enrich, suppress noise, and trigger playbooks(disable user, isolate device, reset credentials). Review Sentinel best practices to prioritize coverage.

  
  

Quick Self‑Check (Before Your Assessment)

• Are your CA policies actually On, not Report‑only? Validate with the CA insights & reporting workbook.

• Do all admin roles require MFA, and are privileged assignments eligible via PIM?

• Is legacy authentication fully blocked, including for service accounts?

• Are User risk and Sign‑in risk policies enabled with recommended enforcement?

• Do you receive PIM alerts when roles are assigned or activated?

• Are app permissions right‑sized and secrets governed per Microsoft guidance?

• Do you have Sentinel analytics + automation actively reducing noise and speeding response?

  
  

The Inception Protection Advantage

Inception Protection is our turnkey approach to hardening Microsoft 365 and Azure using the licensing you already have—no shelfware. We start with identity-first controls (least privilege, CA enforcement, risk-based policies, and full legacy auth retirement), tighten app/service principal governance, and make Sentinel actually detect and respond—so you get fewer open doors, faster detection, and faster response.

Free Microsoft 365 Security Assessment

→ Book Your Free Microsoft 365 Security Assessment you get: a prioritized findings report mapped to the seven gaps above, a remediation plan aligned to Microsoft Learn guidance, and immediate quick wins—no obligation.

FAQ

Q1: We’ve built lots of CA rules. How do we turn them on safely? Use Report‑only first, analyze impact via the CA insights & reporting workbook, then stage to production. Exclude macOS/iOS/Android during device‑compliance evaluations in Report‑only to avoid repeated prompts while testing.

Q2: Which admin roles need MFA?Microsoft recommends requiring MFA for administrator roles via Conditional Access. Start with the built‑in template or the “require MFA for admins” configuration and expand as needed.

Q3: Can we simply enable Security Defaults to block legacy authentication? Yes—if you aren’t using CA, Security Defaults block legacy auth. With CA, deploy “Block legacy authentication”: start in Report‑only, validate, then set On.

Q4: Where should we start with Sentinel detections? Install relevant Content hub solutions, enable scheduled analytics rules, and implement automation rules for enrichment/triage. Expand with custom KQL for your environment.