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PolyShell Magento Attack: Hunt the CMS Block Loader
What this means for your clients: a Magento store can look patched and still send shoppers' browsers to an attacker domain, because the loader often sits in the database rather than in a scanned file. A client's Magento storefront passes a routine file scan. Then a shopper's browser loads a script from deepveindrilling[.]com, and the next stage decides whether that visitor looks like a real buyer or a scanner. That is the PolyShell Magento problem Sansec has been tracking. Po
10 min read


php2shell PHP RCE: Patch Order and Hunts for MSPs
Update, 30 October: CISA added both PHP2Shell CVEs to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on October 26. Dream Research reports a campaign that chained a custom PHP2Shell exploit with the Linux kernel flaw CVE-2026-46300, which it calls Fragnesia, and rooted 25 Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS firewall and management servers. Dream says the attacker targeted the PAN-OS 12.1 and 12.2 branches running PHP 8.0.30, and that the exploit was built for PAN-OS and was not a copy of
20 min read


Cairn AI Agent Intrusions: Hunt the PHP Uploader Shells
What this means for your clients: criminals are now letting AI agents spend a day probing online shops at what NorForge estimates is a few dollars per attempt, and the file they leave behind can look like an ordinary upload form. Take a popular online store with enough traffic to make an attacker's shortlist. Before any agent touches it, a script checks that the store really takes orders. Then a set of AI agents gets one goal: find a way to run code on the site without loggin
10 min read


Hunt the Magento payment email that runs PHP for you
The leftover is not a failed checkout ticket. It is a process that looks like time sync, a cron line that restarts twice an hour, and a Payment Transaction Failed Reminder that already ran PHP while Magento rendered it. Nobody needed to open the message. Delivery can fail, and the planted code still executes. That is StyleSmuggler after the styles poison, not another Magento zero-day recap. Here is the plain version before the product jargon. An unauthenticated attacker poiso
4 min read
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