What this means for your clients: a Magento store can look patched and still send shoppers' browsers to an attacker domain, because the loader often sits in the database rather than in a scanned file. A client's Magento storefront passes a routine file scan. Then a shopper's browser loads a script from deepveindrilling[.]com, and the next stage decides whether that visitor looks like a real buyer or a scanner. That is the PolyShell Magento problem Sansec has been tracking. Po

Update, Oct 24, 2026: Sansec revised its view on October 22. It now says mass exploitation is less likely than it expected on release day, because an attack needs specific knowledge of the target server and specific conditions on it, and the public exploits do not work against a default PHP installation. Sansec also notes that a researcher who tested the public exploits found that most public proof of concept exploits need a separate local file inclusion bug in the applicatio

What this means for your clients: criminals are now letting AI agents spend a day probing online shops at what NorForge estimates is a few dollars per attempt, and the file they leave behind can look like an ordinary upload form. Take a popular online store with enough traffic to make an attacker's shortlist. Before any agent touches it, a script checks that the store really takes orders. Then a set of AI agents gets one goal: find a way to run code on the site without loggin

The leftover is not a failed checkout ticket. It is a process that looks like time sync, a cron line that restarts twice an hour, and a Payment Transaction Failed Reminder that already ran PHP while Magento rendered it. Nobody needed to open the message. Delivery can fail, and the planted code still executes. That is StyleSmuggler after the styles poison, not another Magento zero-day recap. Here is the plain version before the product jargon. An unauthenticated attacker poiso